Top Gun immortalised fighter jets, but there are better ways to help Ukraine win this war

Field Marshal Montgomery famously said in the Second World War that “if we lose the war in the air, we lose the war, and we lose it very quickly”.

Given Russia‘s significant air power (AP) advantage over Ukraine, why has the Russian Air Force (RuAF) failed to capitalise, and would the provision of Western fighter jets to Kyiv prove decisive?

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AP is a complex suite of capabilities. The Russian surface-to-air missiles (SAM) systems provide layered defence, and military aircraft with modern long-range air-to-air missiles, airborne radar systems, electronic warfare assets, and a range of intelligence and support aircraft (including air-to-air refuelling) present a compelling potential capability.

However, the Ukrainian air defence system continues to provide a very hostile environment for the RuAF.

To date, 130 Russian aircraft have been lost over Ukraine (10% of available assets). And since most of the military aircraft over Ukraine are RuAF, the Ukrainian land forces consider any military aircraft a threat – “if it flies, it dies”.

As a result, a major threat to Ukraine’s own fighter jets is inadvertently being shot down by their own soldiers.

Most Western military analysts believe air power would swiftly overwhelm Russian defences and prove decisive.

However, there is no legal mandate for NATO to engage, and no evident appetite from any individual nations to commit combatants to a war with Russia.

So, if the West cannot supply air power capability, how best to equip and enable Ukraine to do so itself?

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Fighter jets are incredibly capable, but also extremely complex.

Although Ukrainian fighter pilots are frustrated with their near-obsolete Soviet-era MIGs, providing them with modern F-16s or similar would not address Ukraine’s medium-term capability needs.

In time, the Ukrainian pilots could learn how to operate the Western aircraft and associated complex equipment.

But that would not address the other vital elements of air power capability required to translate a complex fast-jet aircraft into a battle winning capability.

As a result, the fighter jets would be vulnerable, which in turn would risk emboldening the RuAF.

A more pragmatic (and timely) approach might be to consider upgrading Ukraine’s MIG-29 fighters with modern radars, weapons and air-to-air missiles – the platforms and tactics are familiar, and the technology could prove decisive.

Hollywood films such as Top Gun might have immortalised the role of the fighter aircraft, but in reality, AP is very much a team sport.

President Zelensky is right to recognise the decisive capability that AP could provide, but there are numerous more effective ways to deliver decisive war fighting capability to Ukraine than gifting fighter jets.