How Sam Bankman-Fried swindled $8 billion in customer money, according to federal prosecutors
Before his surprise Monday night arrest, Sam Bankman-Fried had apologized for everything he could think of, to everyone who would listen. In a leaked draft of his aborted House testimony, he wrote that he was truly, for his entire adult life, “sad.” He “f—– up,” he tweeted, and wrote, and said.
He told Bahamas regulators he was “deeply sorry for ending up in this position.” But when Bankman-Fried was escorted out of his penthouse apartment in Nassau in handcuffs, it still wasn’t clear what he was apologizing for, having stridently denied committing fraud to CNBC’s Andrew Ross Sorkin, ABC News’ George Stephanopoulos, and across Twitter for weeks.
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But the day after his arrest, federal prosecutors and regulators unsealed dozens of pages of filings and charges that accused Bankman-Fried of not just having perpetrated a fraud, but having done so “from the start,” according to a filing from the Securities Exchange Commission
Far from having “f—– up,” SEC and Commodity Futures Trading Commission regulators, alongside federal prosecutors from the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, allege that Bankman-Fried was at the heart — indeed, the driver — of “one of the biggest financial frauds in American history,” in the words of U.S. Attorney Damian Williams. The allegations against Bankman-Fried were assembled with stunning speed, but offer insight into one of the highest-profile fraud prosecutions since Enron.
Bankman-Fried founded his crypto hedge fund Alameda Research in November 2017, renting office space in Berkeley, California. The scion of two Stanford law professors, Bankman-Fried had graduated from MIT, worked at the prestigious quantitative trading firm Jane Street Capital, and had broken into cryptocurrencies with a MIT classmate, Gary Wang.
Alameda Research was essentially an arbitrage shop, purchasing bitcoin at a lower price from one exchange and selling it for a higher price at another. Price differences in South Korea versus the rest of the world allowed Bankman-Fried and Wang to profit tremendously from what was nicknamed “the kimchi swap.”
In April 2019, Bankman-Fried and Wang — along with U.C. Berkeley graduate Nishad Singh — founded FTX.com, an international cryptocurrency exchange that offered customers innovative trading features, a responsive platform, and a reliable experience.
Federal regulators at the CFTC say that just a month after founding FTX.com, Bankman-Fried, “unbeknownst to all but a small circle of insiders,” was leveraging customer assets — specifically, customers’ personal cryptocurrency deposits — for Alameda’s own bets.
Rehypothecation is the term for when businesses legally use customer assets to speculate and invest. But Bankman-Fried didn’t have permission from customers to gamble with their funds. FTX’s own terms of use specifically forbade him, or Alameda, from using customer money for anything — unless the customer allowed it.
And from FTX’s inception, there was a lot of customer money. The CFTC cited 2019 reports from FTX which pegged the futures volume alone as often exceeding $100 million every day.
Using customer money for Alameda’s bets constituted fraud, the CFTC alleges. In the Southern District of New York, where Bankman-Fried was indicted by a grand jury, Bankman-Fried faces criminal fraud charges as well. From the very genesis of FTX, regulators allege, Bankman-Fried was using customer funds to bankroll his speculative investments.
It is a swift fall from grace for the one-time king of crypto, who as recently as two months ago was hailed as the savior of the industry. Now, Bankman-Fried heads to a Bahamian court on Monday to surrender himself to the U.S. extradition process, according to a person familiar with the matter. A criminal trial awaits him once he is back on U.S. soil.
Attorneys for Bankman-Fried, and attorneys for his former companies, did not immediately return requests for comment. A representative for Bankman-Fried declined to comment.
The rise of the Alameda-FTX empire
FTX quickly rose, launching its own token, FTT, in July 2019 and snagging an equity investment from Binance in November of that year.
By 2021, according to the CFTC filing, FTX and its subsidiaries held roughly $15 billion worth of assets, and accounted for 10% of global digital transaction volume, clearing $16 billion worth of customer trades every day.
The firm’s “years-long” fraud didn’t just extend to playing with customer money, according to the SEC.
FTX was able to operate so effectively, clear such massive volume, and generate such interest because it had a designated market maker (DMM) of its own. In traditional finance, a DMM is a firm that will buy and sell securities to and from customers, hoping to clear a profit in any difference in price, called the spread.
From FTX’s 2019 founding, Alameda was that market maker, snapping up and releasing cryptocurrencies on the exchange. Alameda and FTX’s symbiotic relationship proved advantageous for both ends of Bankman-Fried’s growing empire.
As FTX matured, other market makers came online to offer liquidity. But Alameda was, and remained, FTX’s largest liquidity provider, easing platform function at “Bankman-Fried’s direction,” the SEC alleges.
Unlike those other market makers or power users, Alameda had a set of powerful tools at its disposal.
In August 2019, the SEC alleges, Bankman-Fried directed his team at FTX to program an exception into the exchange’s code, allowing Alameda to “maintain a negative balance in its account, untethered from any collateral requirements.”
“No other customer account at FTX was permitted to maintain a negative balance,” the SEC filing continues. The negative balance meant that Alameda was allegedly effectively backstopped by customer assets while making trades.
Former Alameda CEO Caroline Ellison once alluded to this in a widely disseminated interview.
“We tend not to have things like stop losses,” Ellison said.
In traditional finance, a stop-loss order helps traders limit exposure to a potentially losing trade. When an asset (a stock, for example) reaches a pre-determined lower limit, the stop-loss order will automatically sell off the asset to prevent losses from spiraling out of control.
Not content with what would eventually become a “virtually unlimited” line of credit from investors — his own customers — Bankman-Fried conspired to stack the deck in Alameda’s favor, regulators say.
FTX offered power users access to an API — an interface that allowed the user to bypass FTX’s front-end platform and communicate directly with FTX’s back-end systems. Normal users were still subjected to common-sense checks: verifying that they had enough money in their account, for example.
Alameda traders could access a fast-lane which let them shunt past other users and shave “several milliseconds” off their trade execution times, according to the CFTC. The kind of high-frequency trading that FTX users engaged in made that invaluable.
A lousy crypto hedge fund
Despite the deck being stacked in Alameda’s favor, the hedge fund offered terrible returns. A court filing indicated that Alameda lost over $3.7 billion over its lifetime, despite public statements by FTX leaders touting how profitable the trading arm was.
Alameda’s losses and lending structure were a critical component of FTX’s eventual collapse.
Alameda didn’t just play fast and loose with customer money. The hedge fund borrowed aggressively from multiple lenders, including Voyager Digital and BlockFi Lending. Both those companies entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings this year, and FTX targeted both for acquisition.
Alameda secured its loans from Voyager and BlockFi with FTT tokens, which FTX minted itself. Bankman-Fried’s empire controlled the vast majority of the available currency, with only a small amount of FTT actually circulating at any time.
Alameda should have acknowledged the fact that its tokens couldn’t be sold at the price that they claimed they were worth, the CFTC alleges in its complaint.
This was because any attempt by Alameda to sell off their FTT tokens would crater FTT’s price, given how much of the available supply Alameda controlled.
Instead of correctly marking its tokens to market, though, Alameda recorded their entire hoard of FTT as being worth the prevailing market price.
Alameda used this methodology with other coins as well, including Solana and Serum (a token created and promoted by FTX and Alameda), using them to collateralize billions in loans to other crypto players. Industry insiders even had a nickname for those tokens — “Sam coins.”
The tables turned after the collapse of Luna, a stablecoin whose implosion and subsequent crash devastated other lenders and crypto firms and sent crypto prices plunging. Major Alameda lenders, like Voyager, declared bankruptcy. Remaining lenders began to execute margin calls or liquidate open positions with customers, including Alameda.
The CFTC alleges that between May and June 2022, Alameda was subjected to “a large number of margin calls and loan recalls.”
Unbeknownst to investors, lenders, or regulators, Alameda lacked enough liquid assets to service its loan obligations.
But while Alameda was illiquid, FTX’s customers — who had been constantly reassured that the exchange, and Bankman-Fried, were determined to protect their interests — were not.
The fraud — exposed
Bankman-Fried stepped down from his leadership position at Alameda Research in Oct. 2021 in what CFTC regulators claim was a calculated bid to cultivate a false sense of separation between FTX and the hedge fund. But he continued to exercise control, regulators claim.
Bankman-Fried allegedly ordered Alameda to increase its use of customer assets, drawing down massively on its “unlimited” credit line at FTX.
“Alameda was able to rely on its undisclosed ordinary-course access to FTX credit and customer funds to facilitate these large withdrawals, which were several billion dollars in notional value,” the CFTC filing reads.
By the middle of 2022, Alameda owed FTX’s unwitting customers approximately $8 billion. Bankman-Fried had testified before the House that FTX boasted world-class risk management and compliance systems, but in reality, according to the firm’s own bankruptcy filings, it possessed almost nothing in the way of record-keeping.
Then, on Nov. 2, the first domino fell. Crypto trade publication CoinDesk publicized details on Alameda’s balance sheet which showed $14.6 billion in assets. Over $7 billion of those assets were either FTT tokens or Bankman-Fried-backed coins like Solana or Serum. Another $2 billion were locked away in equity investments.
For the first time ever, the secretive inner workings of Alameda Research were revealed to be a modern-day Potemkin village. Investors began to liquidate their FTT tokens and withdraw their holdings from FTX, a potentially calamitous situation for Bankman-Fried.
Alameda still had billions of collateralized loans outstanding — but if the value of their collateral, FTT, fell too far, their lenders would execute further margin calls, demanding full repayment of loans.
Allegedly, Alameda had already been unable to fulfill loan obligations over the summer without accessing customer funds. Now, with money flowing out of the exchange and FTT’s price slipping, Alameda and FTX faced a liquidity crunch.
In a now-deleted tweet, Bankman-Fried continued to claim FTX was fully funded and that customer assets were safe. But on Nov. 6, four days after the CoinDesk article, the crack widened into a chasm, thanks to an old investor-turned-rival, Changpeng “CZ” Zhao.
Zhao founded Binance in 2017, and it was the first outside investor in FTX, funding a Series A round in 2019. It had exited the investment by July 2021, the same year that FTX raised $1 billion from big names like Sequoia Capital and Thoma Bravo.
FTX bought out Binance with a combination of BUSD, BNB, and FTT, according to Zhao.
BUSD is Binance’s exchange-issued stablecoin, pegged to the value of the U.S. dollar. BNB is their exchange token, similar to FTX’s FTT, issued by Binance and used to pay transaction and trading fees on the exchange.
Zhao dropped the hammer with a tweet saying that because of “recent revelations that have came [sic] to light, we have decided to liquidate any remaining FTT on our books.”
FTX executives scrambled to contain potential damage. Ellison responded to Zhao offering to purchase Binance’s remaining FTT position for $22 per token.
Privately, Bankman-Fried ordered Alameda traders to liquidate Alameda’s investments and positions “to rapidly free up capital for FTT buybacks,” the CFTC filing states. Bankman-Fried was preparing to bet the house in an effort to maintain Ellison’s public support level of $22.
Alameda traders managed to fend off outflows for two days, holding the price of FTT at around $22.
Publicly, Bankman-Fried continued to operate as if all was well. “FTX is fine. Assets are fine,” he wrote in a tweet on Nov. 7 that has since been deleted. Bankman-Fried asserted that FTX did not invest client assets and that all redemptions would be processed.
But at the same time Bankman-Fried was tweeting reassurances, internally, executives were growing more and more alarmed at the increasing shortfall, according to prosecutors. It was “not merely a matter of having sufficient liquid funds on hand to cover customer withdrawals,” the CFTC alleges.
Rather, Bankman-Fried and other executives admitted to each other that “FTX customer funds were irrevocably lost because Alameda had appropriated them.”
It was an admission that flew in the face of everything Bankman-Fried would claim publicly up through the day of his arrest, a month later.
By Nov. 8, the shortfall had grown from $1 billion to $8 billion. Bankman-Fried had been courting outside investors for a rescue package. “Numerous parties declined […] regardless of the favorable terms being offered,” the CFTC filing alleges.
FTX issued a pause on all customer withdrawals that day. FTT’s price plummeted by over 75%. Bankman-Fried was in the midst of a high-tech, decentralized run on the bank. Out of options, he turned to Zhao, who announced that he’d signed a “non-binding” letter of intent to acquire FTX.com.
But just a day later, on Nov. 9, Binance said it would not go through with the acquisition, citing reports of “mishandled customer funds” and federal investigations.
Two days later, Bankman-Fried resigned as CEO of FTX and associated entities. FTX’s longtime attorneys at Sullivan & Cromwell approached John J. Ray, who oversaw Enron through its bankruptcy, to assume Bankman-Fried’s former position.
FTX filed for bankruptcy that same day, on Nov. 11. A month later, Bankman-Fried was arrested by Bahamian authorities, pending extradition on charges of fraud, conspiracy, and money laundering.
Bankman-Fried, a devotee of a philosophy known as “effective altruism,” was apparently driven by an obsessive need to quantify the impact he had on this world, measured in dollars and tokens. He drafted a spreadsheet which measured the influence that Alameda had on the planet (and determined it was nearly a net wash).
Billions of dollars of customer money are now floating in venture funds, political war chests and charitable coffers — money now at risk of being clawed back, thanks to Bankman-Fried’s alleged crimes.
Almost a decade ago, Bankman-Fried posed a hypothetical question to his friends and family on his personal blog: Waxing poetic on effective altruism, he asked rhetorically, “Just how much impact can a dollar have?”
“Well, if you want a one-sentence answer, here it is: one two thousandth of a life,” he said.
The CFTC alleges that over $8 billion dollars of customer funds are missing. Some customers have doubtless lost their life savings, their kid’s college funds, their future down payments. By Bankman-Fried’s own math, his alleged misdeeds were worth four million lives.
HAWESVILLE, KY – May 10
Plant workers drive along an aluminum potline at Century Aluminum Company’s Hawesville plant in Hawesville, Ky. on Wednesday, May 10, 2017. (Photo by Luke Sharrett /For The Washington Post via Getty Images)
Aluminum
The Washington Post | The Washington Post | Getty Images
Sweeping tariffs on imported aluminum imposed by U.S. President Donald Trump are succeeding in reshaping global trade flows and inflating costs for American consumers, but are falling short of their primary goal: to revive domestic aluminum production.
Instead, rising costs, particularly skyrocketing electricity prices in the U.S. relative to global competitors, are leading to smelter closures rather than restarts.
The impact of aluminum tariffs at 25% is starkly visible in the physical aluminum market. While benchmark aluminum prices on the London Metal Exchange provide a global reference, the actual cost of acquiring the metal involves regional delivery premiums.
This premium now largely reflects the tariff cost itself.
In stark contrast, European premiums were noted by JPMorgan analysts as being over 30% lower year-to-date, creating a significant divergence driven directly by U.S. trade policy.
This cost will ultimately be borne by downstream users, according to Trond Olaf Christophersen, the chief financial officer of Norway-based Hydro, one of the world’s largest aluminum producers. The company was formerly known as Norsk Hydro.
“It’s very likely that this will end up as higher prices for U.S. consumers,” Christophersen told CNBC, noting the tariff cost is a “pass-through.” Shares of Hydro have collapsed by around 17% since tariffs were imposed.
The downstream impact of the tariffs is already being felt by Thule Group, a Hydro customer that makes cargo boxes fitted atop cars. The company said it’ll raise prices by about 10% even though it manufactures the majority of the goods sold in the U.S locally, as prices of raw materials, such as steel and aluminum, have shot up.
But while tariffs are effectively leading to prices rise in the U.S., they haven’t spurred a revival in domestic smelting, the energy-intensive process of producing primary aluminum.
The primary barrier remains the lack of access to competitively priced, long-term power, according to the industry.
“Energy costs are a significant factor in the overall production cost of a smelter,” said Ami Shivkar, principal analyst of aluminum markets at analytics firm Wood Mackenzie. “High energy costs plague the US aluminium industry, forcing cutbacks and closures.”
“Canadian, Norwegian, and Middle Eastern aluminium smelters typically secure long-term energy contracts or operate captive power generation facilities. US smelter capacity, however, largely relies on short-term power contracts, placing it at a disadvantage,” Shivkar added, noting that energy costs for U.S. aluminum smelters were about $550 per tonne compared to $290 per tonne for Canadian smelters.
Recent events involving major U.S. producers underscore this power vulnerability.
In March 2023, Alcoa Corp announced the permanent closure of its 279,000 metric ton Intalco smelter, which had been idle since 2020. Alcoa said that the facility “cannot be competitive for the long-term,” partly because it “lacks access to competitively priced power.”
Similarly, in June 2022, Century Aluminum, the largest U.S. primary aluminum producer, was forced to temporarily idle its massive Hawesville, Kentucky smelter – North America’s largest producer of military-grade aluminum – citing a “direct result of skyrocketing energy costs.”
Century stated the power cost required to run the facility had “more than tripled the historical average in a very short period,” necessitating a curtailment expected to last nine to twelve months until prices normalized.
The industry has also not had a respite as demand for electricity from non-industrial sources has risen in recent years.
Hydro’s Christophersen pointed to the artificial intelligence boom and the proliferation of data centers as new competitors for power. He suggested that new energy production capacity in the U.S., from nuclear, wind or solar, is being rapidly consumed by the tech sector.
“The tech sector, they have a much higher ability to pay than the aluminium industry,” he said, noting the high double-digit margins of the tech sector compared to the often low single-digit margins at aluminum producers. Hydro reported an 8.3% profit margin in the first quarter of 2025, an increase from the 3.5% it reported for the previous quarter, according to Factset data.
“Our view, and for us to build a smelter [in the U.S.], we would need cheap power. We don’t see the possibility in the current market to get that,” the CFO added. “The lack of competitive power is the reason why we don’t think that would be interesting for us.”
While failing to ignite domestic primary production, the tariffs are undeniably causing what Christophersen termed a “reshuffling of trade flows.”
When U.S. market access becomes more costly or restricted, metal flows to other destinations.
Christophersen described a brief period when exceptionally high U.S. tariffs on Canadian aluminum — 25% additional tariffs on top of the aluminum-specific tariffs — made exporting to Europe temporarily more attractive for Canadian producers. Consequently, more European metals would have made their way into the U.S. market to make up for the demand gap vacated by Canadian aluminum.
The price impact has even extended to domestic scrap metal prices, which have adjusted upwards in line with the tariff-inflated Midwest premium.
Hydro, also the world’s largest aluminum extruder, utilizes both domestic scrap and imported Canadian primary metal in its U.S. operations. The company makes products such as window frames and facades in the country through extrusion, which is the process of pushing aluminum through a die to create a specific shape.
“We are buying U.S. scrap [aluminium]. A local raw material. But still, the scrap prices now include, indirectly, the tariff cost,” Christophersen explained. “We pay the tariff cost in reality, because the scrap price adjusts to the Midwest premium.”
“We are paying the tariff cost, but we quickly pass it on, so it’s exactly the same [for us],” he added.
RBC Capital Markets analysts confirmed this pass-through mechanism for Hydro’s extrusions business, saying “typically higher LME prices and premiums will be passed onto the customer.”
This pass-through has occurred amid broader market headwinds, particularly downstream among Hydro’s customers.
RBC highlighted the “weak spot remains the extrusion divisions” in Hydro’s recent results and noted a guidance downgrade, reflecting sluggish demand in sectors like building and construction.
— CNBC’s Greg Kennedy contributed reporting.
Danish energy giant Ørsted has canceled plans for the Hornsea 4 offshore wind farm, dealing a major blow to the UK’s renewable energy ambitions.
Hornsea 4, at a massive 2.4 gigawatts (GW), would have become one of the largest offshore wind farms in the world, generating enough clean electricity to power over 1 million UK homes. But Ørsted announced that it’s abandoning the project “in its current form.”
“The adverse macroeconomic developments, continued supply chain challenges, and increased execution, market, and operational risks have eroded the value creation,” said Rasmus Errboe, group president and CEO of Ørsted.
Reuters reported that Ørsted’s cancellation of Hornsea 4 would result in a projected loss of up to 5.5 billion Danish crowns ($837.85 million) in breakaway fees and asset write-downs. The company’s market value has declined by 80% since its peak in 2021.
The cancellation highlights significant challenges currently facing offshore wind development in Europe, particularly in the UK. The combination of higher material costs, inflation, and global financial instability has made large-scale renewable projects increasingly difficult to finance and complete.
Ørsted’s decision is a significant setback to the UK’s energy transition goals. The UK currently has around 15 GW of offshore wind, and Hornsea 4’s size would have provided almost 7% of the additional capacity needed for the UK’s 50 GW by 2030 target, according to The Times. Losing this immense project off the Yorkshire coast could hamper the UK’s pace of reducing dependency on fossil fuels, especially amid volatile global energy markets.
The UK government reiterated its commitment to renewable energy, promising to work closely with industry leaders to overcome financial and logistical hurdles. Energy Secretary Ed Miliband told reporters in Norway that the UK is “still committed to working with Orsted to seek to make Hornsea 4 happen by 2030.”
Ørsted says it remains committed to its other UK-based projects, including the Hornsea 3 wind farm, which is expected to generate around 2.9 GW once completed at the end of 2027. Despite the challenges, the company emphasized its ongoing commitment to the British renewable market, pointing to the critical need for policy support and economic stability to ensure future developments.
Yet, the cancellation of Hornsea 4 demonstrates that even flagship renewable projects are vulnerable in the face of economic pressures and global uncertainties, which have been heightened under the Trump administration in the US.
Read more: The world’s single-largest wind farm gets the green light
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The Tesla Roadster appears to be quietly disappearing after years of delay. is it ever going to be made?
I may have jinxed it with Betteridge’s Law of Headlines, which suggests any headline ending in a question mark can be answered with “no.”
The prototype for the next-generation Tesla Roadster was first unveiled in 2017, and it was supposed to come into production in 2020, but it has been delayed every year since then.
It was supposed to get 620 miles (1,000 km) of range and accelerate from 0 to 60 mph in 1.9 seconds.
It has become a sort of running joke, and there are doubts that it will ever come to market despite Tesla’s promise of dozens of free new Roadsters to Tesla owners who participated in its referral program years ago.
Tesla uses the promise of free Roadsters to help generate billions of dollars worth of sales, which Tesla owners delivered, but the automaker never delivered on its part of the agreement.
Furthermore, many people placed deposits ranging from $50,000 to $250,000 to reserve the vehicle, which was supposed to hit the market 5 years ago.
The official timelines from Tesla are pretty useless at this point since they haven’t stuck to any of them, but the latest official one dates back to July 2024 when CEO Elon Musk said this:
“With respect to Roadster, we’ve completed most of the engineering. And I think there’s still some upgrades we want to make to it, but we expect to be in production with Roadster next year. It will be something special.”
He said that Tesla had completed “most of the engineering”, but he initially said the engineering would be done in 2021 and that was already 3 years after the prototype was unveiled and a year after it was supposed to be in production:
Musk commented on the Roadster again in October 2024, but he didn’t reiterate the 2025 timeline. Instead, he called the new Roadster “the cherry on the icing on the cake.”
Tesla’s leadership has been virtually silent about the new Roadster since. Two Tesla executives even had to be reminded about the Roadster by Jay Leno after they “forgot” about it when listing upcoming new Tesla vehicles with tri-motor powertrain.
There was one small update about the Roadster in Tesla’s financial results last month.
The automaker has a table of all its vehicle production, and the Roadster was updated from “in development” to “design development” in the table:
It’s not clear if that’s progress or Tesla is just rephrasing it. Either way, it is not “construction”, which makes it unlikely that the Roadster is going into production this year.
If ever…
Electrek’s Take
It looks like Tesla owes about 80 Tesla Roadsters for free to Tesla owners who referred purchases, and it owes significant discounts on hundreds of units.
It’s hard for me to believe that Tesla is not delivering the new Roadster because the vehicle program would start about $100 million in the red, but at this point, I have no idea. It very well might be the reason.
However, I think it’s more likely that Tesla is just terrible at bringing multiple vehicle programs to market simultaneously. Case in point: it launched a single new vehicle in the last five years.
At this point, I think it’s more likely that the Roadster will never happen. It will join other Tesla products like the Cybertruck Range Extender.
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