When realignment leaves a school behind: 10 teams and how they fared
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Bill Connelly, ESPN Staff Writer
Over the first quarter of the 21st century, Washington State and Oregon State combined for five AP top-10 finishes and shares of two conference titles — modest totals, sure, but superior to those of Arizona, Arizona State, Cal and Colorado combined. Over the past six seasons, Wazzu’s average SP+ rating ranked fifth in the Pac-12, Oregon State’s seventh. They have been solid mid-tier, power-conference programs in recent times, and their highs have been higher than those of many of their peers.
None of this matters, of course. In last summer’s depressing conference realignment free-for-all, the Pac-12’s leaders failed to come up with a sufficient television deal, and, with furrowed brows and great displays of consternation, eight programs made moves they said they preferred not to make: Oregon and Washington followed USC and UCLA to the Big Ten with diminished media rights shares; Arizona, Arizona State, Colorado and Utah left for the Big 12; and Cal and Stanford left for a conference with “Atlantic” in its title (ACC).
Meanwhile, the programs in faraway Corvallis, Oregon, and Pullman, Washington, were left without a home. OSU and Wazzu have maintained the rights to the Pac-12 brand while forming short-term scheduling coalitions with the Mountain West (in football) and West Coast Conference (in other sports). But the Pac-12 as we knew it no longer exists, there is no longer a power conference based in the Pacific time zone, and Oregon State and Washington State have been, for all intents and purposes, left behind.
Following all of these demoralizing developments, both programs began 2023 with a point to prove. Washington State beat two ranked teams (Wisconsin and Oregon State) and began October unbeaten and 13th in the AP poll. And despite the loss to the Cougars, Oregon State spent the entire regular season ranked and rose as high as 10th heading into the back half of November. But Wazzu lost seven of its final eight games to finish 5-7, and after an 8-2 start, Oregon State first suffered a narrow loss to unbeaten Washington, then lost to Oregon and Notre Dame by a combined 71-15.
Oregon State head coach Jonathan Smith left for the Big Ten’s Michigan State and took some assistants with him, and in addition lost three NFL draftees. The Beavers then proceeded to lose starting quarterback DJ Uiagalelei (Florida State), QB-of-the-future Aidan Chiles (Michigan State), star running back Damien Martinez (Miami), No. 1 receiver Silas Bolden (Texas), tight end Jack Velling (Michigan State), all-conference guard Tanner Miller (Michigan State), linebacker Easton Mascarenas-Arnold (USC), rush end Sione Lolohea (Florida State), safety Akili Arnold (USC) and corner Jermod McCoy (Tennessee) to schools in power-conference programs. Wazzu’s losses were less extensive following the team’s late collapse, but quarterback Cam Ward (Miami), receiver Josh Kelly (Texas Tech) and cornerback Javan Robinson (Arizona State) departed for power-conference programs.
What has happened to these programs is just impossibly cruel and demoralizing. But if there’s any reassurance whatsoever to be found, it’s that these schools are not alone. Other programs have been left behind before, and those that kept their acts together and figured out ways to continue fielding strong teams were eventually rewarded. (Others, not so much.) Here are the stories of 10 postwar programs that lost their relative power-conference status and what happened next.
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Raiding the Pacific Coast | SWC demise
Big East Frankenstein | What’s ahead for Pac-2
Culling of the Pacific Coast Conference
The Pacific Coast Conference — which became the AAWU, which became the Pac-8, which became the Pac-10, which became the Pac-12 — was a pretty dramatic place. At the end of the 1940s, it consisted of Cal, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Oregon State, Stanford, UCLA, USC, Washington and Washington State, but the loftier programs in that bunch rarely deigned to play the two lowliest members.
In its final 10 seasons in the league before officially getting the boot in 1950, Montana played 31 games against PCC foes: 10 against Idaho (four home, six away), five against Washington State (one home, four away), four against Washington (all away), three against Oregon State (one home, two away) and nine against the other five members (all away). Throughout the 1950s, Idaho basically played home-and-homes with Oregon, Oregon State and Wazzu and got occasional road games with Washington. Conferences were loose affiliations in those days, and none of the California schools wanted an affiliation with the Grizzlies or Vandals if it meant acknowledging them in any way.
In 1959, following mudslinging and accusations of slush-fund activities at a number of schools — Washington, UCLA, USC, Cal (though Cal’s was more “fake work program” than “slush fund,” if we’re picking nits) — the PCC fell apart. The most ambitious schools of the bunch (basically the ones accused of the rule-breaking, plus Stanford) began angling to create a national “Airplane Conference” with eastern independents such as Notre Dame, Penn State, Pitt, Syracuse and the service academies. (In a way, in finally ditching Wazzu, Washington accomplished what it has been trying to accomplish since the 1950s.) The Airplane Conference concept eventually fell apart, and Oregon, Oregon State and Wazzu were eventually allowed back in to the party. Idaho very predictably was not.
The first two members of the Left Behind club didn’t see their lives change all that much because, though Idaho had some sprightly moments, neither played much like a power program anyway.
Last 10 years before demotion: 4.5 average wins, 18.7% average SP+ percentile rating
First 10 years after demotion: 2.3 average wins, 5.6% average SP+ percentile rating
Montana joined the Skyline Conference — made up primarily of future Mountain West teams — for most of the 1950s and, finding it difficult to compete there, too, helped form the lower-division Big Sky Conference in 1963. Things have worked out pretty well for the Grizzlies there: They’ve won or shared 19 Big Sky titles, plus FCS national titles in 1995 and 2001.
Last 10 years before demotion: 3.3 average wins, 26.9% average SP+ percentile rating
First 10 years after demotion: 3.4 average wins, 20.3% average SP+ percentile rating
Idaho held on to a bit more ambition than Montana, for better or worse. The Vandals were also founding Big Sky members and participated there in other sports, but after getting the PCC boot they remained at college football’s top level as an independent until 1974.
After some success at the FCS level, they joined ambitious Boise State in jumping back up to the FBS in the 1990s. Over 22 seasons, they bowled three times and bounced from the Big West to the Sun Belt to the WAC and back to the Sun Belt. But they weren’t good enough for the Mountain West and, without a natural home, officially dropped back down to the FCS in 2018. They’ve made the playoffs there the past two years.
Demise of the Southwest Conference
The dawn of the superconference brought quite a bit of expansion. The Big Ten added Penn State in 1993; the SEC attempted to add Arkansas, Texas and Texas A&M before settling for just the Hogs and South Carolina in 1992; and the Pac-10 weighed expansion into intriguing TV markets such as Denver (Colorado, Colorado State, Air Force), Dallas (SMU, TCU) and Houston (Houston, Rice) before bailing on the idea.
Eventually, the Big 12 formed from the members of the Big Eight and half the scandal-plagued SWC. With the Pac-10 choosing against expansion, that left the other half of the SWC on the outside looking in. Over the SWC’s final five seasons, the abandoned half — Houston, Rice, SMU and TCU — had gone a combined 71-144-6 with one bowl appearance among those schools. NCAA sanctions had crushed Houston and SMU in particular, and they had all chosen a bad time to not have their respective acts together.
It was a long journey back, but with SMU joining the ACC in 2024, three of the SWC’s four left-behind programs are now back on power-conference rosters. (Yes, we’re still calling the ACC and Big 12 power conferences even if the Big Ten and SEC have formed a big two of sorts.)
Last 10 years before demotion: 4.8 average wins, 33.8% average SP+ percentile rating
First 10 years after demotion: 7.3 average wins, 48.9% average SP+ percentile rating
After a combination of NCAA sanctions and general ineptitude had rendered TCU an afterthought of a football program — the Horned Frogs finished above .500 just twice in the 22 seasons from 1972 to 1993 — it was beginning to show signs of life under Pat Sullivan when the SWC fell apart. That quickly ceased, however: The Horned Frogs went 5-17 in their first two seasons in the expanded WAC, and Sullivan was replaced by Dennis Franchione.
Under first Franchione and then Gary Patterson, however, TCU turned itself around. It also had no qualms in jumping from opportunity to opportunity. In the WAC, Conference USA and Mountain West, the Frogs won double-digit games nine times from 2000 to 2011, peaking with a 36-3 run, three top-10 finishes and a Rose Bowl win from 2008 to 2010. That, plus their residence in the Dallas-Fort Worth market, made them obvious candidates for Big 12 membership when the conference looked to replenish recent realignment losses in 2012. They’ve enjoyed four more top-10 finishes over the past 10 years. This is the model left-behind program.
Last 10 years before demotion: 4.6 average wins, 46.5% average SP+ percentile rating
First 10 years after demotion: 4.4 average wins, 25.0% average SP+ percentile rating
It took Houston a bit longer to get its act together. The Cougars were indeed waylaid by NCAA sanctions and had won just four games in the past three seasons when they became founding members of Conference USA in 1996. They averaged only four wins per season before hiring Art Briles in 2003. Briles and successor Kevin Sumlin raised the profile of the program with pure offensive firepower, and in 2011 Houston enjoyed its first ranked finish in 21 years.
The Cougars joined the remnants of the Big East in the freshly named American Athletic Conference in 2013, and under Tom Herman in 2015 they went 13-1 and beat Florida State in a New Year’s Six bowl. It has been an up-and-down ride since, as neither Major Applewhite nor Dana Holgorsen were able to generate any post-Herman consistency, but a combination of obvious upside and the Houston market got them into the Big 12 in 2023.
Last 10 years before demotion: 2.6 average wins, 17.3% average SP+ percentile rating
First 10 years after demotion: 3.8 average wins, 18.3% average SP+ percentile rating
At least Houston didn’t get the death penalty. After nearly winning the national title in 1981 at the peak of the Pony Excess days, SMU slowly slipped under the steady drip of sanctions, then was forced to cease all football operations in 1987-88 when it refused to, uh, stop cheating.
As it turns out, the death penalty works. SMU returned to play in 1989 and enjoyed just one above-.500 season (a bowl-less 6-5 campaign under Mike Cavan in 1997) over the next 20 years as a member of first the WAC, then Conference USA. June Jones managed to create both an offensive identity and a steady bowl presence in the early 2010s, however, and after falling apart in their first seasons in the AAC, the Mustangs rebounded once more. They enjoyed their first 10-win season in 35 years under Sonny Dykes in 2019, and after Dykes left for rival TCU a couple of years later, Rhett Lashlee led SMU to its first ranked finish in 39 years last fall. This recent success, combined with the Dallas market and a willingness to gamble by foregoing all media rights revenue for a few years, earned them an ACC invitation.
Last 10 years before demotion: 3.7 average wins, 29.5% average SP+ percentile rating
First 10 years after demotion: 4.8 average wins, 26.8% average SP+ percentile rating
Rice … is a hard job. It was a hard job in the SWC, and it has remained a hard job in Conference USA and, as of 2023, the AAC. The Owls probably miss playing their bigger in-state rivals on a more frequent basis, but they have basically the same program as they did before being left behind, only they average a bit higher win total with easier competition.
Semi-demise of the Big East
As a football entity, the Big East was both a product and victim of the conference realignment era. A basketball powerhouse in the 1980s, it attempted to secure a bright future by bringing in football brands such as Miami and Virginia Tech in the 1990s and found some success. But it was always a Frankenstein of basketball and football schools.
In the 2000s, the conference lost Miami, Virginia Tech, Boston College, Pitt and Syracuse to the ACC and grabbed whatever it could to survive — DePaul and Marquette on the basketball side, Cincinnati, Louisville (which it would also lose to the ACC) and USF on the football side — and as it prepared to raid the mid-major ranks for more football programs in the early-2010s, the basketball schools decided enough was enough. They formed a new Big East, and the remaining football schools formed the AAC.
The Big East had a power-conference designation when the BCS existed, but when the College Football Playoff came about in 2014, it no longer recognized the AAC as a power. That meant four Big East holdovers — Cincinnati, UConn, USF and Temple — all entered the left-behind zone. (You could technically say the same for the AAC’s four 2013 additions: Houston, Memphis, SMU and UCF. But we’ll say they weren’t around long enough to get truly left behind at this time.)
Last 10 years before demotion: 8.0 average wins, 66.9% average SP+ percentile rating
First 10 years after demotion: 8.6 average wins, 61.2% average SP+ percentile rating
Under Brian Kelly and Butch Jones, Cincinnati enjoyed five seasons of double-digit wins and four ranked finishes in the Big East’s final six seasons of football existence. This program deserved to be in a power conference but suddenly wasn’t. But like TCU, it went about proving itself after an initial setback. Luke Fickell led the Bearcats to 44 wins in four seasons from 2018 to 2021. They won back-to-back AAC titles in 2020-21, first reaching a New Year’s Six bowl, then reaching the CFP (where, as I will forever remind people, they fared better against Alabama than Michigan did against Georgia).
When the Big 12 began to look for new programs following Oklahoma’s and Texas’ announced departures, Cincinnati had to be the first program on the list. Granted, it face-planted upon arrival, replacing Wisconsin-bound Fickell with Scott Satterfield and promptly going 3-9. But this is still a program worthy of the power designation it was stripped of for nine years.
Last 10 years before demotion: 6.9 average wins, 61.1% average SP+ percentile rating
First 10 years after demotion: 3.0 average wins, 10.3% average SP+ percentile rating
After a long football life in the Yankee Conference, UConn grew ambitious enough to attempt FBS life in the early 2000s. The Huskies had a readymade spot in a power conference waiting for them, and they met the moment for a little while, winning either eight or nine games in five of their first seven Big East seasons. But things fell off course when Randy Edsall left for Maryland in 2011, and they were in no way playing like a power-conference program when they lost their power designation.
They left the AAC to return to the Big East in non-football sports, and they’ve been independent since 2020. Life has been mostly hard. Since earning a share of the Big East title — and winning the tiebreakers to earn a Fiesta Bowl bid — in 2010, they’ve suffered 12 straight losing records. They were left behind, but they were already in the process of falling apart when that happened.
Last 10 years before demotion: 6.5 average wins, 62.2% average SP+ percentile rating
First 10 years after demotion: 5.0 average wins, 34.4% average SP+ percentile rating
USF made this “major college football” thing look pretty easy at first. As a startup program under their first coach, Jim Leavitt, the Bulls enjoyed winning seasons in their first four FBS seasons, then joined the Big East in 2005, bowled for six straight years and spent time in the AP top 10 in both 2007 and 2008. But they fell from eight wins to five to three under Leavitt’s replacement, Skip Holtz — like at UConn, things had already fallen apart when South Florida lost its power-conference designation — and their years in the AAC have been a roller coaster: a combined 6-18 in 2013-14, then 21-4 in 2016-17, then 4-29 in 2020-22.
The Bulls were too putrid to earn a look from the Big 12 in the early 2020s, even as it was pilfering conference rival UCF. They could be on their way to another high under Alex Golesh — he’s one of the sport’s more intriguing young coaches — and the Tampa-St. Petersburg market might be intriguing enough to make them candidates for future expansion of a Big 12 or ACC if they can both get and keep their act together. But for now, it seems like the AAC is about the right weight class.
If we don’t count Houston and SMU, Temple might be the only program to ever get left behind twice. The Owls were booted from the Big East in 2005 for general ineptitude — in 14 years of Big East membership, they averaged 2.1 wins and never won more than four games in a season. But after they got their act together in the refuge of the MAC, they were brought back to the Big East in 2012 … just in time for it to become the AAC in 2013.
Last 10 years before first demotion: 2.4 average wins, 22.8% average SP+ percentile rating
First 10 years after first demotion: 4.8 average wins, 26.0% average SP+ percentile rating
Last 10 years before second demotion: 4.3 average wins, 23.6% average SP+ percentile rating
First 10 years after second demotion: 5.8 average wins, 39.1% average SP+ percentile rating
This has always been a pretty hard job — the facilities are crammed into one corner of Temple’s metropolitan campus, and the Owls play off campus at the Philadelphia Eagles’ far-too-cavernous Lincoln Financial Field. When they make a strong hire, like Al Golden (2006-10) or Matt Rhule (2013-16), they can rise pretty high, whether they’re in a power conference or not. But the floor remains pretty low, as they’ve rediscovered of late.
The Pac-2
Every story is unique, and we can’t say we know a lot about what will happen to Oregon State and Washington State based on what happened to Montana in the 1950s or a post-death penalty SMU in the 1990s. But averages might still tell us something.
Average 10 years before second demotion: 4.7 wins, 37.2% SP+ percentile rating
Average 10 years after second demotion: 4.8 wins, 28.7% SP+ percentile rating
Basically, the left-behind programs tend to fall in quality a bit while maintaining familiar win totals (thanks to lesser strengths of schedule). Let’s see what that might mean for Washington State and Oregon State moving forward.
Last 10 years before demotion: 6.6 average wins, 62.1% average SP+ percentile rating
Wazzu has been a higher-upside Temple in recent history, balancing both the capacity for painfully low lows (the Cougs went 5-32 from 2008 to 2010) and solid eight- to 10-win capabilities when things are going well. They have fallen off a hair since Mike Leach left in 2020, but with what amounts to a Mountain West schedule in 2024, they are projected to win around eight games on average based on initial 2024 SP+ projections.
Last 10 years before demotion: 4.6 average wins, 41.9% average SP+ percentile rating
Before beginning a surge under Jonathan Smith in 2021, Oregon State had endured a solid run of struggle, with seven straight losing seasons from 2014 to 2020. Winning 18 games in 2022-23 was great, and the recent success is propping up the Beavers’ SP+ projections despite the extreme personnel losses. They were 44th in the initial February projections, and they’ll probably be in the mid-50s, close to Wazzu, when the May updates are released. With the MWC schedule at hand, that should keep them in the realm of bowl eligibility.
When it comes to future power-conference membership, it’s hard to say anything particularly encouraging at the moment. But as the Beavers face a future in either the Mountain West or a remodeled Pac-12 that strongly resembles the MWC, they can at least take heart in the fact that we have no idea what the future holds in terms of conference alignment and that, even though it’s not really their fault they’re in this position to begin with, if they field successful football teams moving forward — more TCU, less UConn — they could improve their lot a few years down the line.
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Alden Gonzalez
The Los Angeles Dodgers aren’t just a baseball team these days. They are a symbol. For fans of the other 29 major league clubs, they are a source of either indignation or longing. For rival owners — and the commissioner who answers to them — they exemplify a widening payroll disparity that must be addressed. For players, and the union that represents them, they are a beacon, embodying all the traits of successful organizations: astute at player development, invested in behind-the-scenes components that make a difference and, most prominently, eager to pump their outsized revenues back into the roster.
The Dodgers employ seven players on nine-figure contracts, with five of those deals reached over the past 15 months. They also have the strongest farm system in the sport, according to ESPN’s Kiley McDaniel. Their lineup is loaded and their rotation is decorated, but also their future looks bright and their resources seem limitless. And yet their chief architect, Andrew Friedman, isn’t ready for a victory lap.
“It just doesn’t really land with me in that way,” Friedman, entering his 11th year as the Dodgers’ president of baseball operations, said in a recent phone conversation. “I think once I get fired, once there’s like real distance between being mired in the day-to-day and when I’m not, I will be able to look back at those things. But for us right now, it all feels very precarious.
“We’ve seen a lot of really successful organizations that fall off a cliff and take a while to build back. We don’t take any of it for granted.”
Nothing lasts forever. Every empire has fallen, every dynasty has faded. But what the Dodgers have built feels uniquely sustainable. A glaring reminder came last month, when Major League Baseball’s commissioner, Rob Manfred, was asked whether outrage over the Dodgers’ spending reminded him of how fans felt about the star-laden New York Yankees teams of the early 2000s, commonly referred to as “The Evil Empire.”
The current Dodgers, Manfred said, “are probably more profitable on a percentage basis than the old Yankees were, meaning it could be more sustainable, so it is more of a problem.”
The word “problem” depends on one’s perspective. Dodgers fans certainly wouldn’t describe it as such. As the team prepares to begin its season on Tuesday against the Chicago Cubs in Japan — a country in which they are revered, in a series sponsored by their ownership group — it’s worth understanding how the Dodgers got here.
It was the result of their process, but it also required several monumental steps over the past dozen years.
Below is a look at their biggest leaps.
Jan. 28, 2013: They signed a media megadeal
At the start of 2013, the Dodgers, less than a year into Guggenheim’s ownership, landed a massive local-media deal spanning 25 years and valued at $8.35 billion, or $334 million annually on average. But for the rest of that decade, it qualified as a massive headache. A stalemate between AT&T and Charter Communications meant more than half the Southern California market was unable to access the team’s channel, SportsNet LA, from 2014 to 2020.
As the impasse continued and tensions escalated, the Dodgers’ media deal came to symbolize a growing clash between sports channels that demand higher fees and content distributors wary of making customers pay for content they do not consume. Now — five years after the two sides finally struck a deal, airing Dodgers games on AT&T video platforms and nearly doubling the number of households to more than 3 million — it exemplifies a growing disparity that is rattling the industry.
The Dodgers’ local-media deal runs longer than most and is more expensive than any other, but here’s the kicker, according to a source familiar with the deal: While most regional sports networks are set up as subsidiaries underneath a corporate entity, leaving them in the lurch when they fall into hard times — like Diamond Sports Group, a former Sinclair subsidiary that was forced into bankruptcy when debt mounted and subscribers fell off — the Dodgers have complete corporate backing from Charter, a massive media conglomerate.
So not only do the Dodgers generate far more in local media than any of their competitors, but at a time when the linear-cable model is drying up and teams face increasing uncertainty with RSN contracts that represent about 20% of revenues, their deal is relatively iron-clad. That is especially valuable considering they’re in a division where three teams — the San Diego Padres, Arizona Diamondbacks and Colorado Rockies — have lost their local media deals.
Dec. 21, 2018: They swung a trade that streamlined their payroll
Four days before Christmas in 2018, the Dodgers executed a rare salary dump. Matt Kemp, Yasiel Puig, Alex Wood, Kyle Farmer and cash were sent to the Cincinnati Reds for Homer Bailey, who was promptly released, and two young players who would later help trigger blockbuster acquisitions, Jeter Downs and Josiah Gray. The prospect component was secondary; the real benefit was the money saved, which gave the Dodgers additional wiggle room under the luxury-tax threshold and helped them remain debt-service compliant the following year.
In a bigger sense, it was the culmination of a multi-year effort by the front office to rid the Dodgers of bloated contracts and streamline a payroll that ultimately became burdened by massive deals for players like Kemp, Andre Ethier, Carl Crawford and Adrián González. The Dodgers’ luxury-tax payroll dropped by about $50 million from 2017 to 2019, by which point only two players — A.J. Pollock and Kenta Maeda — were signed beyond the next two years. In Friedman’s mind, the Dodgers were now free to be aggressive.
“For our first four to five years, it was as much about trying to be as competitive as we could be while getting our future payroll outlook in a better spot,” he said. “At the end of the 2019 season was the first time we had reached that point and were in position to be more aggressive at the top of the free-agent class.”
Gerrit Cole and Anthony Rendon headlined that offseason’s free-agent class. The Dodgers didn’t come away with either of them.
They would soon make up for it.
Feb. 10, 2020: Mookie Betts became available — and they pounced
The Dodgers engaged in initial trade conversations around Betts leading up to the trade deadline in 2019, but then the Boston Red Sox won five of seven against the Tampa Bay Rays and the New York Yankees near the end of July, and suddenly Betts was unavailable. A tone was set nonetheless.
“We knew, with him going into his last year of control, that there was a chance they would look to trade him going into that offseason,” Friedman recalled. “There was a switch in their baseball-operations department, and Chaim Bloom was hired, who I have a good relationship with. I spent a lot of time talking to him in the beginning. For him, it was about getting his feet on the ground and understanding the organizational direction of what they were doing. And it wasn’t until January where he opened the door to engage.”
Friedman, who gave Bloom his first front-office job in Tampa, ultimately landed Betts and David Price for Alex Verdugo, Downs and another position-player prospect in Connor Wong on Feb. 10, 2020. Friedman had long coveted Betts not just for his supreme talent, but for his work ethic and competitive edge and how those qualities seemed to elevate those around him. Within five months, Betts agreed to a 12-year, $365 million extension, eschewing free agency.
March 17, 2022: Freddie Freeman became a surprise free agent addition
When Freeman hit free agency after winning the 2021 World Series with the Braves, Friedman assumed he would simply return to Atlanta. So did everyone else — Freeman included. He was a homegrown star poised to someday get his number retired and have a statue outside Truist Park. But initial conversations barely progressed, and the Dodgers saw an opening.
On the afternoon of Dec. 1, moments before the sport would shut down in the midst of a bitter labor fight, Dodgers players, coaches and executives gathered for Betts’ wedding in L.A. Friedman, Dodgers manager Dave Roberts and then-third baseman Justin Turner briefly stepped away to call Freeman. They wanted to leave a lasting impression before an owner-imposed lockout would prohibit communication between teams and players. They wanted to be the last club he heard from.
The message, essentially: Don’t forget about us.
Friedman said he “got off the call feeling like it was incredibly unlikely” that the Dodgers would land Freeman. But when the lockout ended on March 10, the Braves and Freeman’s then-agent, Casey Close, still couldn’t bridge the gap, either on length or value. Four days later, the Braves traded for another star first baseman in Matt Olson, leaving Freeman stunned. Three days after that, he pivoted to the Dodgers, coming to terms on a six-year, $162 million contract.
2022-23 offseason: They sat out the shortstop market
When Corey Seager became a free agent at the end of the 2021 season, the Dodgers had a ready-made replacement in Trea Turner, who had been acquired with Max Scherzer the previous summer in a deal that sent Gray and three other minor leaguers to the Washington Nationals. But when Turner himself became a free agent a year later, the Dodgers did nothing to shore up one of the sport’s most important positions.
Turner became part of a historic class of free-agent shortstops, along with Carlos Correa, Xander Bogaerts and Dansby Swanson. The Dodgers didn’t pursue any of them, even though they didn’t have a clear replacement. The Dodgers could have avoided years of uncertainty at this position by locking in a proven star, but doing so was hardly entertained.
The reason is now obvious.
“With where we were commitment-wise,” Friedman said, “and with Shohei [Ohtani] coming up the next offseason, it was just a higher bar to clear for us to do something that would have any negative ability for us to pursue Shohei.”
Dec. 11, 2023: Ohtani chose them
By the time Ohtani became a free agent in November of 2023, the Dodgers’ roster was loaded but their payroll was manageable, with only Betts and Freeman guaranteed beyond the next two seasons. The Dodgers could boast a contending team — with two franchise pillars and a wealth of young talent — but also pitch Ohtani on the promise of adding other impact players around him, regardless of his monstrous contract. It worked.
Now, Dec. 11, 2023, stands as one of the most monumental dates in Dodgers history. Ohtani not only joined the Dodgers that day, but he agreed to defer more than 97% of his 10-year, $700 million contract. The Dodgers have become infamous for their propensity to defer money, a mechanism to provide players with a higher guarantee but, given the ability to invest deferred commitments, is mostly beneficial to the Dodgers (though perhaps not as much as one might think).
Ohtani’s deal was followed by the addition of two frontline starters — Yoshinobu Yamamoto, who landed a contract worth $325 million, and Tyler Glasnow, who was acquired via trade and subsequently signed a five-year extension worth close to $140 million. Ohtani didn’t pitch in 2024, but he put together one of the greatest offensive seasons in baseball history, starting the 50/50 club and becoming the first full-time designated hitter to win an MVP.
Just as important, from the Dodgers’ perspective: He generated massive amounts of revenue.
Ohtani had MLB’s top-selling jersey by a wide margin. With him on the roster, the Dodgers struck sponsorship agreements with 11 different Japanese companies during the 2024 season. Two Ohtani bobblehead giveaways prompted fans to line up outside Dodger Stadium up to 10 hours before the first pitch. Japanese guided tours through the ballpark — a twice-a-day, four-day-a-week addition — never relented. The gift shops frequently had lines out the door.
The Dodgers won’t disclose how much additional revenue they generated from Ohtani last year, but team president Stan Kasten has repeatedly said it blew away even their most optimistic projections.
Oct. 9, 2024: They survived Game 4 of the NLDS
It’s amazing, given the space the Dodgers currently occupy, that five months ago they carried a reputation as, well, chokers. Their championship at the end of the COVID-19-shortened 2020 season had been thoroughly dismissed for its unconventionality. More prevalent in the general public’s mind was 2019, 2021, 2022 and 2023, seasons that ended with talented teams getting eliminated early by inferior opponents.
The 2024 season was quickly headed in that direction. On Oct. 9, the Dodgers trailed a Padres club that was widely considered more well-rounded two-games-to-one in the best-of-five National League Division Series. Their depleted rotation had run out of starters. They would stage a bullpen game with their season on the line. And they would survive. The Dodgers shut out the Padres in Game 4, shut them out again in Game 5, then cruised past the New York Mets and Yankees to capture their first full-season championship since 1988.
What followed was a second straight offseason in which the Dodgers added practically every player they wanted. That included a frontline starter (Blake Snell), two corner outfielders (Teoscar Hernandez and Michael Conforto), three premium bullpen pieces (Tanner Scott, Kirby Yates and Blake Treinen), two fan favorites (Clayton Kershaw and Kiké Hernández) and one of the most alluring pitching prospects in a generation (Roki Sasaki). A key utility player (Tommy Edman) was also extended. The cost: another $466.5 million in guaranteed money, immediately after an offseason in which they guaranteed close to $1.4 billion in signings and extensions.
Roberts, fresh off a record-setting extension, has talked about how he might have been fired had he not navigated his Dodgers past the Padres last fall. Friedman acknowledged that the Dodgers probably don’t spend as much if they don’t win the World Series and generate the extra revenue that comes from it, though he called that “a lazy guess.”
Still, when asked how often he has thought about how life would be different if the Dodgers hadn’t won Game 4 of the 2024 NLDS, Friedman said: “Zero minutes.”
“We have been on the good side of those games and on the bad side of those games,” he added, “and I’ve spent zero minutes thinking about what the world would look like if the outcome had been different.”
All that matters now is a reality that exhilarates their fans and infuriates everyone else: The Dodgers look about as insurmountable as a franchise can be in this sport.
The Boston Bruins‘ approach to the trade deadline indicated that perhaps management thought this wasn’t their year, and they would add some future assets for a quick reload this offseason.
But as the chips fall on Monday, the Bruins still have a chance to make the playoffs.
That all begins with a game against the lottery-bound Buffalo Sabres Monday night (7 p.m., ESPN+). A win in that one closes the gap between Boston and the current first wild card, the New York Rangers. The Rangers have 72 points and 30 regulation wins through 68 games, while Boston is at 68 and 23 through 68.
After Buffalo, it’s a road trip through Nevada and California (Golden Knights on Thursday, Sharks on Saturday, Kings on Sunday and Ducks on Wednesday, March 26). All told, the Bruins will play teams currently in playoff position in six of the final 13 games after the matchup with the Sabres; the final five, in particular, could be a spot to make up ground, with two against the injury-struck Devils along with single games against the Sabres, Blackhawks and Penguins.
To be clear, this would be a long shot; in addition to going on a hot streak, the Bruins will need to jump ahead of four teams (which would all need to get cold, in this hypothetical). Stathletes isn’t so sure all of that will fall into place, giving the Bruins a 2.4% chance of making the postseason. But stranger things have happened in recent seasons!
There is a lot of runway left until April 17, the final day of the regular season, and we’ll help you track it all with the NHL playoff watch. As we traverse the final stretch, we’ll provide details on all the playoff races, along with the teams jockeying for position in the 2025 NHL draft lottery.
Note: Playoff chances are via Stathletes.
Jump ahead:
Current playoff matchups
Today’s schedule
Yesterday’s scores
Expanded standings
Race for No. 1 pick
Current playoff matchups
Eastern Conference
A1 Florida Panthers vs. WC1 Ottawa Senators
A2 Tampa Bay Lightning vs. A3 Toronto Maple Leafs
M1 Washington Capitals vs. WC2 New York Rangers
M2 Carolina Hurricanes vs. M3 New Jersey Devils
Western Conference
C1 Winnipeg Jets vs. WC2 Vancouver Canucks
C2 Dallas Stars vs. C3 Colorado Avalanche
P1 Vegas Golden Knights vs. WC1 Minnesota Wild
P2 Edmonton Oilers vs. P3 Los Angeles Kings
Monday’s games
Note: All times ET. All games not on TNT or NHL Network are available to stream on ESPN+ (local blackout restrictions apply).
Buffalo Sabres at Boston Bruins, 7 p.m.
Philadelphia Flyers at Tampa Bay Lightning, 7 p.m.
New Jersey Devils at Columbus Blue Jackets, 7 p.m.
Calgary Flames at Toronto Maple Leafs, 7:30 p.m.
Los Angeles Kings at Minnesota Wild, 8 p.m.
Sunday’s scoreboard
Detroit Red Wings 3, Vegas Golden Knights 0
Colorado Avalanche 4, Dallas Stars 3 (OT)
Edmonton Oilers 3, New York Rangers 1
New York Islanders 4, Florida Panthers 2
St. Louis Blues 7, Anaheim Ducks 2
Utah Hockey Club 3, Vancouver Canucks 1
Winnipeg Jets 3, Seattle Kraken 2 (OT)
Expanded standings
Atlantic Division
Points: 85
Regulation wins: 35
Playoff position: A1
Games left: 14
Points pace: 102.5
Next game: @ CBJ (Thursday)
Playoff chances: 99.9%
Tragic number: N/A
Points: 81
Regulation wins: 33
Playoff position: A2
Games left: 16
Points pace: 100.6
Next game: vs. PHI (Monday)
Playoff chances: 99.9%
Tragic number: N/A
Points: 81
Regulation wins: 31
Playoff position: A3
Games left: 16
Points pace: 100.6
Next game: vs. CGY (Monday)
Playoff chances: 99.9%
Tragic number: N/A
Points: 77
Regulation wins: 27
Playoff position: WC1
Games left: 16
Points pace: 95.7
Next game: @ MTL (Tuesday)
Playoff chances: 98.8%
Tragic number: N/A
Points: 71
Regulation wins: 23
Playoff position: N/A
Games left: 16
Points pace: 88.2
Next game: vs. OTT (Tuesday)
Playoff chances: 20.2%
Tragic number: 32
Points: 70
Regulation wins: 24
Playoff position: N/A
Games left: 15
Points pace: 85.7
Next game: @ WSH (Tuesday)
Playoff chances: 5.3%
Tragic number: 29
Points: 68
Regulation wins: 23
Playoff position: N/A
Games left: 14
Points pace: 82.0
Next game: vs. BUF (Monday)
Playoff chances: 2.4%
Tragic number: 25
Points: 58
Regulation wins: 21
Playoff position: N/A
Games left: 17
Points pace: 73.2
Next game: @ BOS (Monday)
Playoff chances: ~0%
Tragic number: 21
Metro Division
Points: 96
Regulation wins: 37
Playoff position: M1
Games left: 15
Points pace: 117.5
Next game: vs. DET (Tuesday)
Playoff chances: 99.9%
Tragic number: N/A
Points: 86
Regulation wins: 36
Playoff position: M2
Games left: 15
Points pace: 105.3
Next game: @ SJ (Thursday)
Playoff chances: 99.9%
Tragic number: N/A
Points: 78
Regulation wins: 32
Playoff position: M3
Games left: 14
Points pace: 94.1
Next game: @ CBJ (Monday)
Playoff chances: 95.7%
Tragic number: N/A
Points: 72
Regulation wins: 30
Playoff position: WC2
Games left: 14
Points pace: 86.8
Next game: vs. CGY (Tuesday)
Playoff chances: 53.2%
Tragic number: N/A
Points: 70
Regulation wins: 23
Playoff position: N/A
Games left: 16
Points pace: 87.0
Next game: vs. NJ (Monday)
Playoff chances: 16.7%
Tragic number: 31
Points: 68
Regulation wins: 24
Playoff position: N/A
Games left: 16
Points pace: 84.5
Next game: @ PIT (Tuesday)
Playoff chances: 6.4%
Tragic number: 29
Points: 66
Regulation wins: 19
Playoff position: N/A
Games left: 13
Points pace: 78.4
Next game: vs. NYI (Tuesday)
Playoff chances: 0.8%
Tragic number: 21
Points: 64
Regulation wins: 17
Playoff position: N/A
Games left: 14
Points pace: 77.2
Next game: @ TB (Monday)
Playoff chances: 0.5%
Tragic number: 21
Central Division
Points: 98
Regulation wins: 38
Playoff position: C1
Games left: 14
Points pace: 118.2
Next game: @ VAN (Tuesday)
Playoff chances: 99.9%
Tragic number: N/A
Points: 87
Regulation wins: 35
Playoff position: C2
Games left: 16
Points pace: 108.1
Next game: vs. ANA (Tuesday)
Playoff chances: 99.9%
Tragic number: N/A
Points: 85
Regulation wins: 35
Playoff position: C3
Games left: 14
Points pace: 102.5
Next game: @ TOR (Wednesday)
Playoff chances: 99.9%
Tragic number: N/A
Points: 79
Regulation wins: 29
Playoff position: WC1
Games left: 15
Points pace: 96.7
Next game: vs. LA (Monday)
Playoff chances: 91%
Tragic number: N/A
Points: 73
Regulation wins: 24
Playoff position: N/A
Games left: 14
Points pace: 88.0
Next game: @ NSH (Tuesday)
Playoff chances: 32.5%
Tragic number: 29
Points: 71
Regulation wins: 22
Playoff position: N/A
Games left: 15
Points pace: 86.9
Next game: @ EDM (Tuesday)
Playoff chances: 17%
Tragic number: 29
Points: 58
Regulation wins: 21
Playoff position: N/A
Games left: 16
Points pace: 72.1
Next game: vs. STL (Tuesday)
Playoff chances: ~0%
Tragic number: 18
Points: 49
Regulation wins: 17
Playoff position: N/A
Games left: 15
Points pace: 60.0
Next game: vs. SEA (Tuesday)
Playoff chances: ~0%
Tragic number: 7
Pacific Division
Points: 86
Regulation wins: 36
Playoff position: P1
Games left: 15
Points pace: 105.3
Next game: vs. BOS (Thursday)
Playoff chances: 99.9%
Tragic number: N/A
Points: 82
Regulation wins: 28
Playoff position: P2
Games left: 15
Points pace: 100.4
Next game: vs. UTA (Tuesday)
Playoff chances: 99.8%
Tragic number: N/A
Points: 81
Regulation wins: 31
Playoff position: P3
Games left: 17
Points pace: 102.2
Next game: @ MIN (Monday)
Playoff chances: 99.8%
Tragic number: N/A
Points: 73
Regulation wins: 24
Playoff position: WC2
Games left: 15
Points pace: 89.3
Next game: vs. WPG (Tuesday)
Playoff chances: 41.1%
Tragic number: N/A
Points: 71
Regulation wins: 24
Playoff position: N/A
Games left: 17
Points pace: 89.6
Next game: @ TOR (Monday)
Playoff chances: 18.7%
Tragic number: 33
Points: 65
Regulation wins: 21
Playoff position: N/A
Games left: 15
Points pace: 79.6
Next game: @ DAL (Tuesday)
Playoff chances: 0.1%
Tragic number: 23
Points: 63
Regulation wins: 23
Playoff position: N/A
Games left: 14
Points pace: 76.0
Next game: @ CHI (Tuesday)
Playoff chances: ~0%
Tragic number: 19
Points: 45
Regulation wins: 13
Playoff position: N/A
Games left: 14
Points pace: 54.3
Next game: vs. CAR (Thursday)
Playoff chances: ~0%
Tragic number: 1
Race for the No. 1 pick
The NHL uses a draft lottery to determine the order of the first round, so the team that finishes in last place is not guaranteed the No. 1 selection. As of 2021, a team can move up a maximum of 10 spots if it wins the lottery, so only 11 teams are eligible for the No. 1 pick. Full details on the process are here. Matthew Schaefer, a defenseman for the OHL’s Erie Otters, is No. 1 on the draft board.
Points: 45
Regulation wins: 13
Points: 49
Regulation wins: 17
Points: 58
Regulation wins: 21
Points: 58
Regulation wins: 21
Points: 63
Regulation wins: 23
Points: 64
Regulation wins: 17
Points: 65
Regulation wins: 21
Points: 66
Regulation wins: 19
Points: 68
Regulation wins: 23
Points: 68
Regulation wins: 24
Points: 70
Regulation wins: 23
Points: 70
Regulation wins: 24
Points: 71
Regulation wins: 22
Points: 71
Regulation wins: 23
Points: 71
Regulation wins: 24
Points: 73
Regulation wins: 24
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