Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s have both said any ceasefire between their two countries must lead to a lasting peace.

Ukraine has not long marked three years of war, in which hundreds of thousands have died or been injured on both sides, according to the respective authorities.

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The Kremlin’s annexation of more Ukrainian territory during its invasion – which it still calls a “special military operation” -and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s determination to uphold its sovereignty has left many analysts doubtful the war will ever end.

But since his return to the White House, Donald Trump has demanded the two sides “make a deal”, withdrawing vital US support to Kyiv until it agreed to come to the negotiating table.

Mr Zelenskyy has now agreed to a 30-day ceasefire, with Mr Trump due to iron out Russia’s demands in a phone call with Mr Putin on Tuesday.

But beyond that – what would a Ukraine without fighting look like? Here we go through some of the options.

Ongoing ceasefire

Beyond the initial 30-day agreement, providing neither side violates it, the ceasefire could continue indefinitely.

“A ceasefire can go on to be an enduring thing,” Dr David Blagden, associate professor in international security and strategy at the University of Exeter, tells Sky News.

He gives the example of North and South Korea, whereby a demilitarised zone (DMZ) has effectively served as a border between the two countries since the Korean War ended in 1953.

“Even if it doesn’t ever lead to a more satisfactory settlement, it might still be better for both parties than endless conflict,” he says.

But any kind of DMZ would require both Ukraine and Russia to pull their troops away from the frontline, which is unlikely, adds Dr Huseyn Aliyev, senior lecturer in East European studies at the University of Glasgow.

Parts of Ukraine become ‘New Russia’

The alternative would be for both Ukraine and Russia to offer concessions to formally end the war.

Top of Vladimir Putin’s “list of demands” for “long-term peace”, and his justification for invading Ukraine in the first place, is Crimea – and four other regions – Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia – becoming part of a ‘New Russia’, as they were before the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.

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While Luhansk is almost completely under Russian control, Ukraine still holds significant parts of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, making them more difficult for Kyiv to let go of.

“We know neither Crimea nor the Donbas regions [Donetsk and Luhansk] would be returned [to Ukraine] as part of a truce,” Dr Aliyev says. “So it would involve ceding control over those parts.

“But Kherson and Zaporizhzhia are more complicated – especially Kherson – as Kherson city was so painfully liberated by Ukraine in 2022.”

Although many doubt Russia would stop there in terms of territory, Dr Blagden adds: “There would be Russian rationale for being content with what they already have. It’s been hugely costly for them – and destroyed a lot of their expensively modernised military. It’s also filtered through into Russian civilian life, to an extent, via the sanctions and casualties, despite the Kremlin’s efforts to insulate Russia’s upper and middle classes from the worst of the war.

“Likewise, for Ukraine – galling and unfair though it may be – there’s likely now more recognition that retaking lost ground will be desperately hard, especially without assured supplies of US weaponry and intelligence. So, they could have reason to live with some sort of ceasefire too.”

Power plants and infrastructure split

Mr Trump has said his team has already proposed “dividing up certain assets” between the two countries – namely “land and power plants” – and will discuss the details with Mr Putin in a phone call on Tuesday.

He did not give any specifics, but these are likely to include the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, which has been occupied by Russia since March 2022, and is one of the largest in the world.

Other key infrastructure that could come under Moscow’s control includes the Nova Kakhovka dam, blown up in 2023 and not yet rebuilt, and other river crossings.

Zelenskyy replaced

A truce would also likely include a new leader for Ukraine. Mr Zelenskyy has already told Sky News he is open to stepping down if it means Ukraine can join NATO.

One of Mr Putin’s demands is that Ukraine is never allowed NATO membership – but replacing Mr Zelenskyy could still serve to appease him – and Donald Trump, who has called him a “dictator” and accused him of “gambling with World War Three”.

“It would be easier for Zelenskyy to call an election and have somebody replace him,” Dr Aliyev says. “But there’s a problem of who that would be – as there’s not much left of the Ukrainian opposition.”

Contenders include Ukrainian ambassador to the UK Valerii Zaluzhnyi – or one of the generals currently in charge of the military, he adds.

But the Kremlin would prefer a pro-Russian regime in Kyiv, according to Dr Blagden.

“Short of being able to conquer the whole country, a government that’s more favourable towards Russian interests would obviously be their preference,” he says.

“Similar to the one they’ve worked hard to install in Georgia, they might hope for the return of Ukraine’s more pro-Russian politicians and sentiment from before 2014. But of course, Ukrainian opinion is now galvanised against anyone seen as a puppet of Moscow.”

‘Minor concessions’ for Ukraine

Although Russia’s demands would mean a series of heavy blows for Ukraine, there could be some “minor concessions”, security and defence analyst Professor Michael Clarke says.

US national security adviser Mike Waltz has said Ukraine would get “security guarantees” if it agrees to cede territory – but has not specified what they would be.

Other possible concessions include the return of tens of thousands of Ukrainian children who were abducted and forcibly resettled in Russia – and prisoners of war on both sides.

In principle, if a truce was agreed, the International Criminal Court could also begin an investigation into whether war crimes were committed on either side.

“In these situations where there’s a fundamental disagreement and you can’t see the way forward, you often concentrate on some of the minor details,” Professor Clarke says.

Starmer’s ‘coalition of the willing’

Sir Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron have spearheaded the idea of a so-called “coalition of the willing” to uphold a potential truce or ceasefire.

Sir Keir’s team says “more than 30” countries are interested in contributing to the peacekeeping force – but the US has been notably absent from leaders’ meetings so far. Vladimir Putin has also said he would not accept NATO forces in Ukraine, posing a major obstacle to the plans.

The prime minister has not specified how the coalition would work but said that military chiefs would meet to discuss the “operational phase” on Thursday.

Lower risk option

According to the experts, the coalition could take two potential forms.

Neither would involve guarding the entire frontline. That’s because, at 640 miles long, it would require more than 100,000 troops at a time – and 300,000 with rotations.

By contrast, the first option would be stationing troops away from the line of control, largely in western Ukraine – or at key infrastructural sites or transport hubs to ensure they continue running smoothly.

This would be a similar operation to the British one in Estonia – where 900 troops are stationed to deter Russian aggression. The Ukrainian one would involve up to 30,000 personnel and be focused primarily on monitoring, logistics, and training, the experts say.

“The challenge for any peacekeeping force is balancing effectiveness and escalatory risk,” Dr Blagden adds.

“Calling it a ‘peacekeeping’ force might create the impression of neutrality. But of course, it wouldn’t be neutral – they’re there to defend one of two sides. It would be better understood as a garrison whose job would be to ensure that Russia can’t attack Ukraine without attacking NATO troops, and therefore risking a wider war with nuclear-armed powers,” he says.

“A larger combat force closer to the frontline would create more deterrence but with more escalatory risk – whereas a smaller force further from the frontline – perhaps merely fulfilling training and support tasks – would carry much less escalatory risk but therefore also be much less of a deterrent”.

Ordinarily, that deterrent would be hugely bolstered by the US, which under NATO’s Article 5 could send in powerful air forces to attack ones on the ground – as it has in places like Iraq.

But Donald Trump’s tense relations with Ukraine and suggestions the US could leave NATO have thrown its Article 5 obligations into major doubt.

‘Rapid reaction force’ closer to frontline

Alternatively, coalition troops could be sent closer to the frontline, Professor Clarke says.

They would be split into brigades manning four or five strategic bases like the cities of Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv or Kyiv.

Describing them as a “rapid reaction force at high readiness”, Professor Clarke adds: “To be able to go to any trouble spot and snuff it out they’d need a lot of transport – particularly air cover to get there quickly enough.”

They too would likely need to be backed up by a US security guarantee, he says, but under the Trump administration, this is by no means certain.

Neutral peacekeeping force

Alternatively, a peacekeeping force could be led by the United Nations, which would recruit personnel from neutral countries in exchange for incentives, as it does elsewhere.

With the second-largest military in NATO, Turkey could be involved, Dr Aliyev says.

But with Vladimir Putin’s rejection of potential NATO forces, he may be more likely to accept ones from the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) nations, Professor Clarke adds.

“Putin has hinted at troops from the Global South as monitors – because he thinks they are on his side,” he says. India in particular could be a viable option, he says.

“India has got big forces and wants to play a bigger strategic role in the world. Russia wouldn’t want to fire on Indian forces because of the political implications for their relationship – so they might be most acceptable to both Russia and the West.”

While a neutral option might be the most practical – it may not be hugely successful, Dr Aliyev cautions.

“Similar missions in Lebanon and sub-Saharan Africa have been relatively low in effectiveness,” he says.”A UN force might be the most feasible for Russia – but a coalition of the willing would last longer.”