Here’s a quiz question: how much would you say the supply of non-Russian gas to Europe (including the UK) has gone up since the invasion of Ukraine?
It’s a pretty important question. After all, in the years before the invasion, Russian gas (coming in mostly through pipelines but, to a lesser extent, also on liquefied natural gas [LNG] tankers) accounted for more than a third of our gas.
If Europe was going to stop relying on Russian gas, it would need either to source that gas from somewhere else or to learn to live without it. And while there might, a few decades hence, be a way of surviving without gas while also nursing important heavy industries, right now the technology isn’t there.
For decades, Europe – especially Germany, but also, to a lesser extent Italy and other parts of Eastern Europe – built their economic models on building advanced machinery, with their plants fuelled by cheap Russian gas.
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All of which is why that question matters. And so too does the answer. The conventional wisdom is that Europe has shored up its supplies of gas from elsewhere. There’s more methane coming in from Azerbaijan, for one thing. And more too in the form of LNG from Qatar and (especially) the US.
But now let’s ponder the actual data. And it shows you something else: in 2024 as a whole, the amount of gas Europe had from non-Russian sources was up by a mere 0.5% compared with the 2017-21 average.
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This isn’t to say that there wasn’t more gas coming in, primarily from LNG tankers, most (but not all) of them from the US. But that extra LNG was only enough to compensate for a sharp fall in gas produced domestically, for instance by the UK and the Netherlands. The upshot was that to all extents and purposes, the non-Russian part of the European gas mix was basically flat.
That’s a serious problem, given the amount of gas coming in from Russia has fallen by 37% over the same period. Essentially, Europe’s total gas consumption has fallen by an unprecedented amount without being supplemented from elsewhere.
Now, to some extent, some of that lost energy has been supplemented by extra power from renewable sources. The UK, for instance, saw the biggest amount of its power ever coming from wind and other green sources last year. However, green electricity only goes so far. It cannot heat houses with gas boilers; it cannot provide the intense heat needed for many industrial processes. And look at the numbers in Europe and you can see the consequences.
With the continent having effectively to ration gas, the industrial heart has borne the brunt. Look at chemicals production in the UK and it’s down by more than a third in recent years. Look at energy-intensive industrial output in Germany and it’s down by 20% since the invasion of Ukraine. The continent is deindustrialising, and the shortage of gas is at least part of the explanation.
And that shortage is about to become even more acute in the coming months. Because the flow of gas coming from Russia is going to fall yet further. There are, broadly speaking, four routes for Russian gas into Europe. The Yamal pipelines are old Soviet pipes running through Belarus; the Nord Stream pipes run (or rather ran) under the Baltic. There are pipes going through Ukraine towards Slovakia and Austria and then there’s the newest pipes, running through the Black Sea to Turkey.
As of late last year, only two of these routes were still operational: Yamal had been shuttered following sanctions by both sides in 2022; Nord Stream was damaged by an attack later in 2022. And now, following a failure to renew the terms of a transit agreement between Ukraine and Russia, the Ukraine route has just shut too. The amounts of gas we’re talking about aren’t enormous: around 4% of total European supply, as of 2024. But even so, it’s a further blow and will mean more rationing in the coming months. European deindustrialisation will probably continue or accelerate.
According to Jack Sharples, senior research fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies: “In the big picture, the loss of 15 billion cubic metres in 2025 for Europe as a whole equates to 4% of supply in 2024. So, enough to push the market a little tighter in the context of a global LNG market that remains tight, but nothing like the impact of losing Russian pipeline gas supply in 2022.”
Still, this isn’t the only challenge facing the market right now. This time last year, the continent had a near-unprecedented amount of gas stored away. But the amount of gas in storage – a key buffer – has dropped rapidly in recent months, partly because it’s been a little colder than in the previous year, partly because gas has had to step in to provide power when the wind dropped and renewables output disappointed.
The result is the continent starts the year with gas storage at a much lower level than policymakers would like – only 71% full. Admittedly this is higher than the nerve-wrackingly low level of early 2022 (54%). And it’s implausible that Europe will actually exhaust its supplies. But it makes it more likely that the continent will have to pay high prices in the summer to replenish its supplies.
Put it all together and you can understand why wholesale gas prices are climbing higher. The UK may not receive any gas directly from Russia, but it’s plugged into this market, so any shortages on the other side of the channel directly affect the prices we pay here too. And those prices are now up to the highest level since the spring of 2023. This is, it’s worth saying, way lower than the highs of 2022. But it’s enough to suggest bills might be heading up soon.