BOSTON — Prior to last season, the Boston Red Sox renovated the home clubhouse, constructing new maple lockers, adding 16 TV displays and updating the lighting and sound systems to create a modern, sleek look. Maybe most importantly, there is also room to squeeze in a couple of temporary lockers — no small consideration given the current state of the team.

The Red Sox have 13 players on the injured list. It’s been a carousel of players coming and going to fill those spots, lockers emptied for those designated for assignment or sent down to the minors, new ones squeezed into the middle of the floor.

“It’s crazy. Definitely more than I can remember,” outfielder Tyler O’Neill said. “Obviously, we have a lot of star players on the list right now. That sucks. It’s up to the rest of us guys to take a step up to try and fill those holes, but man, we want those guys on the field for sure.”

In April, the Red Sox lost more days and more player dollars to the IL than any other team. Four-fifths of their projected starting rotation is injured, with Lucas Giolito out for the season. Shortstop Trevor Story is also out for the season after fracturing his shoulder. Cleanup hitter Triston Casas, who posted an OPS over 1.000 in the second half in 2023, is out two months with torn cartilage in his rib cage. Designated hitter Masataka Yoshida landed on the IL last week with a hand injury. O’Neill even missed a week himself after suffering a concussion in a collision with third baseman Rafael Devers.

Craig Breslow, the first-year chief baseball officer, has been busy just trying to keep the 26-man active roster filled, while manager Alex Cora has had no choice but to be pragmatic about the whole situation, as the team makes moves on the fly to shore up the roster before a game. Cora believes bench production can help a team win eight or nine games a season — and the Red Sox are certainly testing the limits of that theory right now.

“It’s a star-driven league, we know that, but what you do with the edge of the roster is very important,” Cora said. “We work so hard on chemistry and culture in spring training. Then you have a whole different team in the beginning of May. It’s going to keep changing, but I do believe we’re in a good place. We’re playing good baseball, which is awesome.”

Indeed, the Red Sox beat the Minnesota Twins 9-2 on Sunday to snap a three-game skid and end Minnesota’s 12-game winning streak. Boston is 19-16, within shouting distance of the Baltimore Orioles and New York Yankees in the American League East despite all the injuries.

How have the Red Sox done it? The pitching staff is atop the majors with a 2.59 ERA led by a rotation that has posted the lowest ERA (2.10) through a team’s first 35 games since the 1981 Dodgers had a 2.06 mark. With Giolito (Tommy John surgery), Brayan Bello (back tightness), Nick Pivetta (elbow strain) and Garrett Whitlock (oblique strain) all sidelined at the moment (although Pivetta is expected to return this week), Tanner Houck and Kutter Crawford have stepped up to lead the group — but the success can be attributed as much to a change in philosophy as any one starter’s improvement.

“If we keep doing the things we’re doing on the mound, it doesn’t matter who comes in,” Cora said. “We’re going to be in a good place.”

Breslow and Red Sox pitching coach Andrew Bailey insist their approach to pitching, while unprecedented, isn’t some kind of revolution.

The two were bullpen teammates with the Oakland Athletics and Red Sox during their playing days. They remained friends as Breslow worked for the Chicago Cubs from 2019 to 2023, first as director of pitching and then as assistant GM/vice president of pitching, while Bailey worked as a coach with the Los Angeles Angels and then as the San Francisco Giants’ pitching coach the past four seasons.

“We talked a lot about staying in the game of baseball and working together. Craig’s a brilliant mind and you always knew he was going to be a GM or a manager,” Bailey said, not even mentioning the fact that Breslow majored in molecular biophysics and biochemistry at Yale. “So, yeah, I was like, ‘If you never need a bullpen coach or a pitching coach.'”

After the Red Sox hired Breslow in late October, one of his first calls was to Bailey. Since joining Boston, Bailey has implemented a concept that was one of the trademarks of the Giants under his guidance and has been the key to Boston’s pitching success this season: fewer fastballs.

The Red Sox are throwing the fewest fastballs of any team in MLB in 2024. Just 31.8% of their pitches have been fastballs (either four-seamers or sinkers), well below the MLB average of 47%. Just one other team is under 40%, and no team was below that last season.

“I know a lot has been made of this,” Breslow said, “but if you were to take a step back and say, ‘OK, we can rank all of your pitches and what we’re asking you to do is take your best pitch and throw it more and take your worst pitches and throw them less,’ I don’t think anyone would be like, ‘You’ve reinvented the game.’

“I think what we have done is refuse to be beholden to traditional baseball thought, which says you have to be able to throw a fastball down and away. I would argue you have to be able to throw a pitch over the plate. I have no idea why that has to be a fastball.”

What the Red Sox are doing is simply a more extreme version of a trend we’ve seen across the sport. Detailed pitch tracking data goes back to 2008, and the percentage of fastballs has steadily dropped since then:

2008: 59.8%
2014: 57.0%
2019: 52.4%
2023: 47.8%
2024: 47.0%

That’s happening even as average fastball velocity continues to increase. But fastballs, no matter how hard they’re thrown, get hit — at least more than other pitches. Check out the numbers from 2023:

All fastballs: .269/.354/.447
Curveballs: .224/.274/.372
Sliders/sweepers: .220/.275/.379
Changeups: .239/.287/.381
Cutters: .269/.333/.448

“I think every pitch we make is a business decision,” Bailey said. “These guys are competing to provide income and to obviously play a game at the end of the day, but this is their livelihood, and if they do well, the Red Sox do well, and we win and get to the playoffs. So every pitch we throw is a business decision to make a bet to suppress damage or induce swing-and-miss.”

You can see that mentality in the changes in approach from individual Red Sox pitchers, especially the starters.

Houck has ditched a four-seamer he threw nearly 10% of the time last season — which batters hit .325 and slugged .550 against — and started throwing his splitter more often. His overall fastball rate has dropped 9 percentage points. He has a 1.99 ERA; his strikeout rate has increased 4 percentage points while his walk rate is down 5.

Batters hit just .163 against Crawford’s four-seamer last season, but he’s still throwing it 10% less often in favor of a big increase in his sweeper usage and a slight increase in his splitter. His strikeout and walk rates have held steady, but his hard-hit rate has improved from the 76th percentile to the 95th percentile, resulting in a lower home run rate. His 1.56 ERA through seven starts ranks second in the majors.

Whitlock threw a sinker 53% of the time last season and batters hit .326 and slugged .538 against it. In his four starts before his injury, he added a slider and cutter and dropped his sinker usage to just 22.7%. He has a 1.96 ERA in his limited time. Bello has a 3.04 ERA in five starts after scrapping a four-seam fastball that he threw 21% of the time and which batters hit .310 and slugged .646 off in 2023, now sticking with a three-pitch mix, throwing his changeup and slider more often to go with his sinker.

“I don’t really say that it’s we don’t want to throw fastballs,” Bailey said. “It’s just they don’t produce as great of outcomes as off-speed pitches in general — and some guys have unicorn fastballs. We just want guys to know their identity as a pitcher and use that to their strength.”

The initial talks between Bailey and the pitching staff surrounding a change in approach began in the offseason. Red Sox players took quickly to the message upon arriving at spring training.

“If you know that a certain pitch type is going to outperform another and you can throw that in the zone, why wouldn’t you want to throw that more often than not?” Bailey said.

Finding what to replace the fastball with is essential. For Houck, a splitter he is throwing twice as frequently as a season ago has become an option after he improved it this offseason. A slight grip change has added a little more depth and north-south movement to it, but Houck has also simply grown more confident in using it. Batters hit .310 against the splitter last season, but are hitting .208 without a home run against it in 2024.

“I think my splitter is better than it’s ever been, so I feel more comfortable throwing it any count, where in the past maybe I’d throw a fastball,” he said.

No matter the pitch, an important key for the Red Sox is still strike one and “pounding the zone relentlessly,” as Bailey put it. With fewer fastballs, that means pitchers have to throw breaking balls or off-speed pitches often enough for strikes rather than simply as chase pitches, otherwise batters will eventually adjust to take those pitches for balls and get ahead in the count — forcing pitchers to come in with a fastball that might not be their best pitch.

In the first pitch of a plate appearance, MLB pitchers throw a fastball 51% of the time in 2024 — slightly more often than overall. There can be a price to pay for that, however: When batters put the first pitch in play in 2024, they’re hitting .327 with a .544 slugging percentage. The Red Sox throw a first-pitch fastball just 34.2% of the time, yet they’re still getting a first-pitch strike 62% of the time — a hair above the MLB average. And when the first pitch is in play, Red Sox pitchers have allowed the third-lowest OPS, behind only the Los Angeles Dodgers and Seattle Mariners.

Maybe it’s not quite a revolution, but it’s certainly different from any team we’ve seen before.

“Anytime you stand off on a limb and challenge the norms of what we do …” Bailey started to say, and then paused. “It’s not really challenging the norms. I want our pitchers to succeed. I want them to be the best versions of themselves. I want them to be happy and excited and purposeful and fulfilled. When you look at things through an analytical lens, then you can build a relationship with a player and provide them the support they need to become that best version. You’re just educating them on what they do well and what makes them an outlier relative to the league.”

Breslow is quick to point out that this could just be a moment in time, that in a couple months, maybe the percentages will have changed. Baseball is, after all, a game of adjustments. There is no doubt, however, that the Red Sox are the extreme case of the fewer fastballs movement. Just as every team eventually joined the shift revolution, perhaps in five years every team will be throwing 32% fastballs.

For now, the approach has helped Red Sox pitchers to an extraordinary start that has kept the team over .500 despite all the injuries, a makeshift roster — and one crowded clubhouse.

On a Saturday night in January 2023, the Golden State Warriors had an off night in Chicago.

Draymond Green didn’t want to go to dinner or out on the town. He had another idea: going to the suburbs to watch junior hockey.

“​​How often do you get an opportunity to see Sidney Crosby at 17?” Green reasoned.

The next big thing in hockey is Macklin Celebrini, the unanimous No. 1 prospect of the 2024 NHL draft class. Celebrini is also the son of Rick Celebrini, the Warriors vice president of player health and performance.

NHL Draft lottery: Tonight on ESPN/ESPN+, 6:30 p.m. ET

“I was like, really? You wanna go?” Rick Celebrini said to Green. “I mean, it’s actually not close to where we stay with the team.”

“I don’t care,” Green replied. He wanted to support the Celebrinis.

So a group of Warriors staffers and players arranged a ride to Geneva, Illinois.

“We found out a lot of stuff that night,” Warriors coach Steve Kerr said. “Like Macklin’s nickname was The Cheetah. We didn’t know that until the announcer said something.”

NHL scouts have been dazzled by The Cheetah for years because he is the complete package: elite hockey sense, skill, shot and, yes, his motor. The 5-foot-11 two-way center is also known for his desire to win — and ability to bring his teammates along with him, making everyone great.

But even the best athletes have off nights, and according to Macklin, that was one of them.

“It was not a good game,” Macklin said. “We didn’t play very well.”

Once again, Green didn’t care. He saw enough.

Macklin was just 16, playing against more physically mature 20-year-olds. Everyone on the ice also knew the NHL buzz surrounding him and wanted to make their mark. Opponents kept checking Macklin, again and again.

“One guy comes out of nowhere and just chucks him and Mack stumbles over and he comes right back — chucks the guy, doesn’t fall,” Green recalled. “Mack hits him again to make sure the guy falls. [Macklin] just takes off to the penalty box. That’s going to suit him going forward. There’s always going to be a target on your back. You’re the projected No. 1 pick and I’m not waiting on my bruiser to come lay you out. I’m going to lay you out myself. That said everything I needed to know.”

Macklin Celebrini grew up in Vancouver as the second of four kids. He also played soccer until he was 12, the sport both of his parents played. But hockey always had his heart.

“I started off skating, like any kid would, just skating laps at a public rink,” Macklin said. “Then once I had a stick in my hand, it was game over.” That may be an understatement. At age 10, Macklin competed in the prestigious Brick Invitational Tournament. He had an intense schedule leading up to that tournament, and his team ended up winning.

“It was amazing. But afterward his coach told me, Macklin needs a break after this,” his mom, Robyn, recalled. “Like, hide his skates for two weeks, keep him off the ice.”

Robyn did in fact hide Macklin’s skates.

“That lasted two days,” she said, with a smile. It didn’t help that the local hockey club was within walking distance. Robyn eventually succumbed to Macklin’s pleas.

That Brick Tournament was also the first time the Celebrinis realized Macklin could command a locker room. Rick Celebrini’s favorite story about his son was relayed by one of the team’s assistant coaches.

“The first practice, all the kids were really nervous and quiet in the dressing room, and nobody was talking to each other,” Rick Celebrini said. “And Macklin, I guess he picked this up from hearing some [older players] at his hockey club, but all of the sudden goes in front of everyone and says: ‘Listen up, guys. We only have one rule in this dressing room. There’s no effing swearing in this dressing room.'”

The entire room erupted with laughter. The 10-year-old effectively broke the ice.

The Celebrini kids had exposure to professional athletes from an early age. Rick Celebrini worked for the Vancouver Canucks and MLS Whitecaps before getting the gig with the Warriors. Rick is also a renowned physiotherapist who worked closely with Steve Nash since his rookie season, helping the Hall of Fame point guard overcome a low back condition.

Or, as he’s known in the Celebrini household, Uncle Steve.

“When Macklin was younger, there was sort of almost like an osmosis,” Rick Celebrini said. “He wasn’t really paying attention, but I believe he took a lot of it in, especially the early days when I’d work with Steve Nash and I would spend four or five hours on the court and in the gym.”

As Macklin got older, and Rick took the job with the Warriors in 2018, the lessons became more acute.

“Just being around some professional athletes, you learn how detail-oriented they are,” Macklin said. “How they take care of their bodies, how they approach every day, even in the offseason when it doesn’t really have a translation on the season. Every day they’re still doing something to take care of themselves.”

From an early age, Macklin was determined to reach the highest levels — and began to differentiate himself. “Every step of the way he has set goals that seem almost unreachable,” Rick Celebrini said. “And each step of the way he’s surprised us.”

Macklin enrolled at Shattuck-St. Mary’s in Minnesota in 2020, the same prep school that helped develop one of his idols, Crosby. Macklin’s statistics during that 14AUU season are so absurd, they almost read like a misprint: 51 goals and 141 points in 50 games. After three years there, he was off to the Chicago Steel for junior hockey (46 goals and 86 points in 50 games).

A standout performance at the IIHF World Under-18 Championship in April 2023 firmly cemented his draft stock. Macklin matched Canada’s single-tournament scoring record while making a gorgeous game-winning overtime goal in the bronze medal game. He scored the most points by a Canadian player 16 or younger — edging out Connor Bedard and Connor McDavid.

This past season, as a 17-year-old freshman at Boston University, he won the Hobey Baker Award as best player in the country.

The head of one NHL scouting department told ESPN that Macklin was “as complete a prospect as there is” and said he’s more than ready to make an impact in the NHL next season.

Macklin said he models his game after two-way centers like Jonathan Toews, Brayden Point and Crosby.

“Those guys that do it on both sides of the puck,” he said. “They’re leaders on their teams and they also drive offense.”

He cites Crosby and Patrick Kane as his favorite players to watch growing up.

“The Blackhawks and Penguins both made their runs to the Cups,” he said. “And some of my best memories were just watching them play in the playoffs and battle.” Rick helped Macklin and his siblings — brothers Aiden, 19; RJ, 12; and sister, Charlie, 15 — along each of their athletic journeys, where he balanced the line between trainer and dad.

“When they’re working out, I tell them there has to be a professionalism to your approach and what you do. And that’s when I’m not Dad,” Rick said. “But in their times when they’re vulnerable, then I become Dad, and I’ll always be Dad.”

The family is extremely close, texting and supporting each other constantly. In his interview with ESPN, Macklin wanted to make sure he gave love to his mom, citing her as the one who keeps it all together.

Aiden, a 2023 sixth-round draft pick of the Canucks, was teammates (and roommates) with Macklin at Boston University this season. The 6-foot-1 defenseman is a late bloomer. RJ’s hockey highlights have already gone viral on social media. Meanwhile, Charlie is a fast-rising star on the junior tennis circuit.

“When Rick first got [to Golden State] his kids would be running up and down the court playing pickup 3-on-3, with the whole family, Robyn too,” Kerr said. “It’s so funny seeing them as kids and then all of a sudden, you find out the two older boys are big-time hockey players.

“And then I started to really ask Rick more about his kids and what they were doing. Then there’s little Charlie, the tennis player. And then I realized, Rick’s cooking something up in his house. … He’s just churning out athletes over there.”

There’s a reason the Warriors wanted to support Rick. He’s been crucial to their culture and success.

“He’s one of the best human beings I know, and that’s straight from the heart,” Kerr said. “He’s got this great combination of emotional intelligence and technical knowledge of his field and humor and authority. The players see him every day, and so for us it means so much that he’s one of the first people they see and feel, and he just sets an incredible tone.”

Green called Rick “a giver.”

“He gives his time, he gives his energy, he gives his effort,” Green said. “He’s a magician when it comes to the body. He’s a magician when it comes to the mind. He is our secret weapon and he’s an incredible father. He’s an incredible man.”

Green said he checks in with Rick about Macklin about two to three times per week. Green knows a decent amount about hockey, growing up in Michigan and attending Michigan State. By appearances, Green could tell Macklin had the “it” factor when he first met the pre-teen.

“I’m like, ‘Yep, Mack, you’re definitely a player,'” Green said. “‘You got the hockey hair.'”

While getting to know Macklin over the years, Green was struck by something else. “He’s quiet but super confident, and is not afraid to share that confidence with you,” Green said. “We don’t get the opportunity to see him often, but every chance, he has a smile on his face. He walks in the room like he belongs in the room. Like he’s supposed to be there.

“It’s not something over the top where it’s like, ‘Hey, I need you to realize that I’m here.’ You feel the seriousness when you talk to him. Like, he wants to work, he wants to be great. I have no doubt in my mind that he will be.”

At the Steel game in 2023, the Warriors contingent — minus Rick — left after the second period. After all, it was a long drive back to Chicago. Naturally, Macklin scored after they had departed.

When Rick met Macklin in the locker room afterward, his son gave him a good hockey chirp to pass along to the Warriors.

“Dad,” Macklin said, “I go to your games all the time, and they’re boring as hell, and I don’t leave.”

Rick relayed the story to the Warriors the next day, and the room erupted in laughter.

Over the first quarter of the 21st century, Washington State and Oregon State combined for five AP top-10 finishes and shares of two conference titles — modest totals, sure, but superior to those of Arizona, Arizona State, Cal and Colorado combined. Over the past six seasons, Wazzu’s average SP+ rating ranked fifth in the Pac-12, Oregon State’s seventh. They have been solid mid-tier, power-conference programs in recent times, and their highs have been higher than those of many of their peers.

None of this matters, of course. In last summer’s depressing conference realignment free-for-all, the Pac-12’s leaders failed to come up with a sufficient television deal, and, with furrowed brows and great displays of consternation, eight programs made moves they said they preferred not to make: Oregon and Washington followed USC and UCLA to the Big Ten with diminished media rights shares; Arizona, Arizona State, Colorado and Utah left for the Big 12; and Cal and Stanford left for a conference with “Atlantic” in its title (ACC).

Meanwhile, the programs in faraway Corvallis, Oregon, and Pullman, Washington, were left without a home. OSU and Wazzu have maintained the rights to the Pac-12 brand while forming short-term scheduling coalitions with the Mountain West (in football) and West Coast Conference (in other sports). But the Pac-12 as we knew it no longer exists, there is no longer a power conference based in the Pacific time zone, and Oregon State and Washington State have been, for all intents and purposes, left behind.

Following all of these demoralizing developments, both programs began 2023 with a point to prove. Washington State beat two ranked teams (Wisconsin and Oregon State) and began October unbeaten and 13th in the AP poll. And despite the loss to the Cougars, Oregon State spent the entire regular season ranked and rose as high as 10th heading into the back half of November. But Wazzu lost seven of its final eight games to finish 5-7, and after an 8-2 start, Oregon State first suffered a narrow loss to unbeaten Washington, then lost to Oregon and Notre Dame by a combined 71-15.

Oregon State head coach Jonathan Smith left for the Big Ten’s Michigan State and took some assistants with him, and in addition lost three NFL draftees. The Beavers then proceeded to lose starting quarterback DJ Uiagalelei (Florida State), QB-of-the-future Aidan Chiles (Michigan State), star running back Damien Martinez (Miami), No. 1 receiver Silas Bolden (Texas), tight end Jack Velling (Michigan State), all-conference guard Tanner Miller (Michigan State), linebacker Easton Mascarenas-Arnold (USC), rush end Sione Lolohea (Florida State), safety Akili Arnold (USC) and corner Jermod McCoy (Tennessee) to schools in power-conference programs. Wazzu’s losses were less extensive following the team’s late collapse, but quarterback Cam Ward (Miami), receiver Josh Kelly (Texas Tech) and cornerback Javan Robinson (Arizona State) departed for power-conference programs.

What has happened to these programs is just impossibly cruel and demoralizing. But if there’s any reassurance whatsoever to be found, it’s that these schools are not alone. Other programs have been left behind before, and those that kept their acts together and figured out ways to continue fielding strong teams were eventually rewarded. (Others, not so much.) Here are the stories of 10 postwar programs that lost their relative power-conference status and what happened next.

Jump to a section:
Raiding the Pacific Coast | SWC demise
Big East Frankenstein | What’s ahead for Pac-2

Culling of the Pacific Coast Conference

The Pacific Coast Conference — which became the AAWU, which became the Pac-8, which became the Pac-10, which became the Pac-12 — was a pretty dramatic place. At the end of the 1940s, it consisted of Cal, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Oregon State, Stanford, UCLA, USC, Washington and Washington State, but the loftier programs in that bunch rarely deigned to play the two lowliest members.

In its final 10 seasons in the league before officially getting the boot in 1950, Montana played 31 games against PCC foes: 10 against Idaho (four home, six away), five against Washington State (one home, four away), four against Washington (all away), three against Oregon State (one home, two away) and nine against the other five members (all away). Throughout the 1950s, Idaho basically played home-and-homes with Oregon, Oregon State and Wazzu and got occasional road games with Washington. Conferences were loose affiliations in those days, and none of the California schools wanted an affiliation with the Grizzlies or Vandals if it meant acknowledging them in any way.

In 1959, following mudslinging and accusations of slush-fund activities at a number of schools — Washington, UCLA, USC, Cal (though Cal’s was more “fake work program” than “slush fund,” if we’re picking nits) — the PCC fell apart. The most ambitious schools of the bunch (basically the ones accused of the rule-breaking, plus Stanford) began angling to create a national “Airplane Conference” with eastern independents such as Notre Dame, Penn State, Pitt, Syracuse and the service academies. (In a way, in finally ditching Wazzu, Washington accomplished what it has been trying to accomplish since the 1950s.) The Airplane Conference concept eventually fell apart, and Oregon, Oregon State and Wazzu were eventually allowed back in to the party. Idaho very predictably was not.

The first two members of the Left Behind club didn’t see their lives change all that much because, though Idaho had some sprightly moments, neither played much like a power program anyway.

Last 10 years before demotion: 4.5 average wins, 18.7% average SP+ percentile rating

First 10 years after demotion: 2.3 average wins, 5.6% average SP+ percentile rating

Montana joined the Skyline Conference — made up primarily of future Mountain West teams — for most of the 1950s and, finding it difficult to compete there, too, helped form the lower-division Big Sky Conference in 1963. Things have worked out pretty well for the Grizzlies there: They’ve won or shared 19 Big Sky titles, plus FCS national titles in 1995 and 2001.

Last 10 years before demotion: 3.3 average wins, 26.9% average SP+ percentile rating

First 10 years after demotion: 3.4 average wins, 20.3% average SP+ percentile rating

Idaho held on to a bit more ambition than Montana, for better or worse. The Vandals were also founding Big Sky members and participated there in other sports, but after getting the PCC boot they remained at college football’s top level as an independent until 1974.

After some success at the FCS level, they joined ambitious Boise State in jumping back up to the FBS in the 1990s. Over 22 seasons, they bowled three times and bounced from the Big West to the Sun Belt to the WAC and back to the Sun Belt. But they weren’t good enough for the Mountain West and, without a natural home, officially dropped back down to the FCS in 2018. They’ve made the playoffs there the past two years.

Demise of the Southwest Conference

The dawn of the superconference brought quite a bit of expansion. The Big Ten added Penn State in 1993; the SEC attempted to add Arkansas, Texas and Texas A&M before settling for just the Hogs and South Carolina in 1992; and the Pac-10 weighed expansion into intriguing TV markets such as Denver (Colorado, Colorado State, Air Force), Dallas (SMU, TCU) and Houston (Houston, Rice) before bailing on the idea.

Eventually, the Big 12 formed from the members of the Big Eight and half the scandal-plagued SWC. With the Pac-10 choosing against expansion, that left the other half of the SWC on the outside looking in. Over the SWC’s final five seasons, the abandoned half — Houston, Rice, SMU and TCU — had gone a combined 71-144-6 with one bowl appearance among those schools. NCAA sanctions had crushed Houston and SMU in particular, and they had all chosen a bad time to not have their respective acts together.

It was a long journey back, but with SMU joining the ACC in 2024, three of the SWC’s four left-behind programs are now back on power-conference rosters. (Yes, we’re still calling the ACC and Big 12 power conferences even if the Big Ten and SEC have formed a big two of sorts.)

Last 10 years before demotion: 4.8 average wins, 33.8% average SP+ percentile rating

First 10 years after demotion: 7.3 average wins, 48.9% average SP+ percentile rating

After a combination of NCAA sanctions and general ineptitude had rendered TCU an afterthought of a football program — the Horned Frogs finished above .500 just twice in the 22 seasons from 1972 to 1993 — it was beginning to show signs of life under Pat Sullivan when the SWC fell apart. That quickly ceased, however: The Horned Frogs went 5-17 in their first two seasons in the expanded WAC, and Sullivan was replaced by Dennis Franchione.

Under first Franchione and then Gary Patterson, however, TCU turned itself around. It also had no qualms in jumping from opportunity to opportunity. In the WAC, Conference USA and Mountain West, the Frogs won double-digit games nine times from 2000 to 2011, peaking with a 36-3 run, three top-10 finishes and a Rose Bowl win from 2008 to 2010. That, plus their residence in the Dallas-Fort Worth market, made them obvious candidates for Big 12 membership when the conference looked to replenish recent realignment losses in 2012. They’ve enjoyed four more top-10 finishes over the past 10 years. This is the model left-behind program.

Last 10 years before demotion: 4.6 average wins, 46.5% average SP+ percentile rating

First 10 years after demotion: 4.4 average wins, 25.0% average SP+ percentile rating

It took Houston a bit longer to get its act together. The Cougars were indeed waylaid by NCAA sanctions and had won just four games in the past three seasons when they became founding members of Conference USA in 1996. They averaged only four wins per season before hiring Art Briles in 2003. Briles and successor Kevin Sumlin raised the profile of the program with pure offensive firepower, and in 2011 Houston enjoyed its first ranked finish in 21 years.

The Cougars joined the remnants of the Big East in the freshly named American Athletic Conference in 2013, and under Tom Herman in 2015 they went 13-1 and beat Florida State in a New Year’s Six bowl. It has been an up-and-down ride since, as neither Major Applewhite nor Dana Holgorsen were able to generate any post-Herman consistency, but a combination of obvious upside and the Houston market got them into the Big 12 in 2023.

Last 10 years before demotion: 2.6 average wins, 17.3% average SP+ percentile rating

First 10 years after demotion: 3.8 average wins, 18.3% average SP+ percentile rating

At least Houston didn’t get the death penalty. After nearly winning the national title in 1981 at the peak of the Pony Excess days, SMU slowly slipped under the steady drip of sanctions, then was forced to cease all football operations in 1987-88 when it refused to, uh, stop cheating.

As it turns out, the death penalty works. SMU returned to play in 1989 and enjoyed just one above-.500 season (a bowl-less 6-5 campaign under Mike Cavan in 1997) over the next 20 years as a member of first the WAC, then Conference USA. June Jones managed to create both an offensive identity and a steady bowl presence in the early 2010s, however, and after falling apart in their first seasons in the AAC, the Mustangs rebounded once more. They enjoyed their first 10-win season in 35 years under Sonny Dykes in 2019, and after Dykes left for rival TCU a couple of years later, Rhett Lashlee led SMU to its first ranked finish in 39 years last fall. This recent success, combined with the Dallas market and a willingness to gamble by foregoing all media rights revenue for a few years, earned them an ACC invitation.

Last 10 years before demotion: 3.7 average wins, 29.5% average SP+ percentile rating

First 10 years after demotion: 4.8 average wins, 26.8% average SP+ percentile rating

Rice … is a hard job. It was a hard job in the SWC, and it has remained a hard job in Conference USA and, as of 2023, the AAC. The Owls probably miss playing their bigger in-state rivals on a more frequent basis, but they have basically the same program as they did before being left behind, only they average a bit higher win total with easier competition.

Semi-demise of the Big East

As a football entity, the Big East was both a product and victim of the conference realignment era. A basketball powerhouse in the 1980s, it attempted to secure a bright future by bringing in football brands such as Miami and Virginia Tech in the 1990s and found some success. But it was always a Frankenstein of basketball and football schools.

In the 2000s, the conference lost Miami, Virginia Tech, Boston College, Pitt and Syracuse to the ACC and grabbed whatever it could to survive — DePaul and Marquette on the basketball side, Cincinnati, Louisville (which it would also lose to the ACC) and USF on the football side — and as it prepared to raid the mid-major ranks for more football programs in the early-2010s, the basketball schools decided enough was enough. They formed a new Big East, and the remaining football schools formed the AAC.

The Big East had a power-conference designation when the BCS existed, but when the College Football Playoff came about in 2014, it no longer recognized the AAC as a power. That meant four Big East holdovers — Cincinnati, UConn, USF and Temple — all entered the left-behind zone. (You could technically say the same for the AAC’s four 2013 additions: Houston, Memphis, SMU and UCF. But we’ll say they weren’t around long enough to get truly left behind at this time.)

Last 10 years before demotion: 8.0 average wins, 66.9% average SP+ percentile rating

First 10 years after demotion: 8.6 average wins, 61.2% average SP+ percentile rating

Under Brian Kelly and Butch Jones, Cincinnati enjoyed five seasons of double-digit wins and four ranked finishes in the Big East’s final six seasons of football existence. This program deserved to be in a power conference but suddenly wasn’t. But like TCU, it went about proving itself after an initial setback. Luke Fickell led the Bearcats to 44 wins in four seasons from 2018 to 2021. They won back-to-back AAC titles in 2020-21, first reaching a New Year’s Six bowl, then reaching the CFP (where, as I will forever remind people, they fared better against Alabama than Michigan did against Georgia).

When the Big 12 began to look for new programs following Oklahoma’s and Texas’ announced departures, Cincinnati had to be the first program on the list. Granted, it face-planted upon arrival, replacing Wisconsin-bound Fickell with Scott Satterfield and promptly going 3-9. But this is still a program worthy of the power designation it was stripped of for nine years.

Last 10 years before demotion: 6.9 average wins, 61.1% average SP+ percentile rating

First 10 years after demotion: 3.0 average wins, 10.3% average SP+ percentile rating

After a long football life in the Yankee Conference, UConn grew ambitious enough to attempt FBS life in the early 2000s. The Huskies had a readymade spot in a power conference waiting for them, and they met the moment for a little while, winning either eight or nine games in five of their first seven Big East seasons. But things fell off course when Randy Edsall left for Maryland in 2011, and they were in no way playing like a power-conference program when they lost their power designation.

They left the AAC to return to the Big East in non-football sports, and they’ve been independent since 2020. Life has been mostly hard. Since earning a share of the Big East title — and winning the tiebreakers to earn a Fiesta Bowl bid — in 2010, they’ve suffered 12 straight losing records. They were left behind, but they were already in the process of falling apart when that happened.

Last 10 years before demotion: 6.5 average wins, 62.2% average SP+ percentile rating

First 10 years after demotion: 5.0 average wins, 34.4% average SP+ percentile rating

USF made this “major college football” thing look pretty easy at first. As a startup program under their first coach, Jim Leavitt, the Bulls enjoyed winning seasons in their first four FBS seasons, then joined the Big East in 2005, bowled for six straight years and spent time in the AP top 10 in both 2007 and 2008. But they fell from eight wins to five to three under Leavitt’s replacement, Skip Holtz — like at UConn, things had already fallen apart when South Florida lost its power-conference designation — and their years in the AAC have been a roller coaster: a combined 6-18 in 2013-14, then 21-4 in 2016-17, then 4-29 in 2020-22.

The Bulls were too putrid to earn a look from the Big 12 in the early 2020s, even as it was pilfering conference rival UCF. They could be on their way to another high under Alex Golesh — he’s one of the sport’s more intriguing young coaches — and the Tampa-St. Petersburg market might be intriguing enough to make them candidates for future expansion of a Big 12 or ACC if they can both get and keep their act together. But for now, it seems like the AAC is about the right weight class.

If we don’t count Houston and SMU, Temple might be the only program to ever get left behind twice. The Owls were booted from the Big East in 2005 for general ineptitude — in 14 years of Big East membership, they averaged 2.1 wins and never won more than four games in a season. But after they got their act together in the refuge of the MAC, they were brought back to the Big East in 2012 … just in time for it to become the AAC in 2013.

Last 10 years before first demotion: 2.4 average wins, 22.8% average SP+ percentile rating

First 10 years after first demotion: 4.8 average wins, 26.0% average SP+ percentile rating

Last 10 years before second demotion: 4.3 average wins, 23.6% average SP+ percentile rating

First 10 years after second demotion: 5.8 average wins, 39.1% average SP+ percentile rating

This has always been a pretty hard job — the facilities are crammed into one corner of Temple’s metropolitan campus, and the Owls play off campus at the Philadelphia Eagles’ far-too-cavernous Lincoln Financial Field. When they make a strong hire, like Al Golden (2006-10) or Matt Rhule (2013-16), they can rise pretty high, whether they’re in a power conference or not. But the floor remains pretty low, as they’ve rediscovered of late.

The Pac-2

Every story is unique, and we can’t say we know a lot about what will happen to Oregon State and Washington State based on what happened to Montana in the 1950s or a post-death penalty SMU in the 1990s. But averages might still tell us something.

Average 10 years before second demotion: 4.7 wins, 37.2% SP+ percentile rating

Average 10 years after second demotion: 4.8 wins, 28.7% SP+ percentile rating

Basically, the left-behind programs tend to fall in quality a bit while maintaining familiar win totals (thanks to lesser strengths of schedule). Let’s see what that might mean for Washington State and Oregon State moving forward.

Last 10 years before demotion: 6.6 average wins, 62.1% average SP+ percentile rating

Wazzu has been a higher-upside Temple in recent history, balancing both the capacity for painfully low lows (the Cougs went 5-32 from 2008 to 2010) and solid eight- to 10-win capabilities when things are going well. They have fallen off a hair since Mike Leach left in 2020, but with what amounts to a Mountain West schedule in 2024, they are projected to win around eight games on average based on initial 2024 SP+ projections.

Last 10 years before demotion: 4.6 average wins, 41.9% average SP+ percentile rating

Before beginning a surge under Jonathan Smith in 2021, Oregon State had endured a solid run of struggle, with seven straight losing seasons from 2014 to 2020. Winning 18 games in 2022-23 was great, and the recent success is propping up the Beavers’ SP+ projections despite the extreme personnel losses. They were 44th in the initial February projections, and they’ll probably be in the mid-50s, close to Wazzu, when the May updates are released. With the MWC schedule at hand, that should keep them in the realm of bowl eligibility.

When it comes to future power-conference membership, it’s hard to say anything particularly encouraging at the moment. But as the Beavers face a future in either the Mountain West or a remodeled Pac-12 that strongly resembles the MWC, they can at least take heart in the fact that we have no idea what the future holds in terms of conference alignment and that, even though it’s not really their fault they’re in this position to begin with, if they field successful football teams moving forward — more TCU, less UConn — they could improve their lot a few years down the line.